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2 GLOSSARY 
Access the ability or opportunity to gain knowledge of classified infor-
mation  
Access control the process by which access to a particular area is controlled or 
restricted to authorized personnel only;  
Accreditation  the official authorization by management of the organisation for 
the operation of an Information Technology (IT) system, and ac-
ceptance by that management of the associated residual risk.  
Asset anything that has value for the organisation and includes hard-
ware, software, people, infrastructure, data, suppliers and part-
ners;  
Availability the timely availability of information technology resources in line 
with organisational requirements;  
BCP  business continuity planning which entails the development of 
plans, measures, procedures and arrangements to ensure minimal 
or no interruption of the availability of critical information ser-
vices and assets;  
Budapest Convention the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime; 
Classification the process by which state information is placed into categories 
for purposes of classifying such information in accordance with 
their level of security measures required in securing such infor-
mation.  
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team  
Certification the process to certify that a comprehensive evaluation of the tech-
nical and non-technical security features of an Information and 
Communication Technology system and its related safeguards has 
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been undertaken and that it was established that its design and 
implementation meets a specific set of security requirements;  
CI  critical infrastructures whose unlawful alteration, destruction or 
loss is likely to deny the public or individuals of a service or ben-
efit to which they are entitled;  
CIIS critical information infrastructures which is physical and comput-
er based systems and assets, which are so vital to a country and 
whose incapacity, malfunction or destruction would have a debili-
tating impact on the provision of essential social, economic and 
national security; 
CIIP Critical Information Infrastructure Protection.  
Confidentiality the principle that information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorised individuals, entities or processes. 
Comsec Act the repealed Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Act 
no 68 of 2002; 
Configuration refers to changes made to a system’s hardware, software, firm-
ware and documentation throughout the development and opera-
tional life-cycle of the system;  
CRC the Cyber Response Committee responsible for the coordination 
of Cybersecurity activities in South Africa;  
 Cyberspace  a physical and non-physical terrain created by and/or composed of 
some or all of, amongst others, data, computers, electronic sys-
tems, networks, and end users;  
Cybersecurity  the tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guide-
lines and best practices approaches that can be used to protect the 
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cyber environment as well as the cyber assets of an organization 
and/or users;  
Cryptography the art and science concerning the principles, means, and methods 
for rendering plain information unintelligible and for restoring 
encrypted information to intelligible form;  
CSIRT  a computer security incident response team, a team of dedicated 
information security specialists that prepares for and responds to 
Cybersecurity incidents; 
DTPS the department of State responsible for Telecommunications and 
Postal Services; 
ECT Act  Electronic Communications and Transactions Act no 25 of 2002; 
ECS Electronic Communications Services; 
ECNS Electronic Communications network Services; 
ECSP Electronic Communications Service Providers;  
ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security  
FICA  Financial Intelligence Centre Act  
GLACY  Global Action against Cybercrime, a cybercrime technical capaci-
ty building project of the members of the Budapest convention 
funded by the European Union and implemented by the Council 
of Europe.  
 ICTS  information and communications technologies that are used to 
store, communicate and manipulate data.  
Integrity  the inherent quality of protection that maintains the accuracy of 
entities of an information system and ensures that the entities are 
not altered or destroyed in an unauthorised manner;  
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Internet governance  the development and application of shared principles, norms, 
rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the 
evolution and use of the Internet.  
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation, a non-
Governmental Organisation responsible for, amongst others, the 
development of international standards for Information security; 
ISPA the Internet Service providers Association of South Africa; 
ITU the International Telecommunications Union  
Majoritarianism a political belief that simple numerical majority of citizens should 
rule a country the way it wants with total disregard of the views of 
other citizens outside of that numerical majority; 
Mobile device  any portable device that can perform the same function as com-
puter equipment including laptops, tablet PCs, cellular telephones 
and data cards; 
NCII  National Critical Information Infrastructures which are all the ICT 
systems, data systems, data bases, networks including physical in-
frastructure, that are fundamental to the effective operation of the 
Republic;  
NCPF  the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework, is a policy state-
ment of South Africa outlining the policy approach of government 
in addressing cyber security related matters; 
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations.  
Network  a system of two or more computers that can exchange data or in-
formation; 
NKP Act  the National Key Points Act, 1980 (Act No. 102 of 1980);  
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NKPs the National Key Points declared as such in terms of the National 
Key Points Act;  
Organ of State  an Organ of the State as defined in the Constitution of the Repub-
lic of South Africa;  
OWASP  the Open Web Applications Security Project, a non-governmental 
organisation that educates information security experts on com-
mon Web application vulnerabilities;  
Phishing  a fraudulent way of acquiring sensitive information such as 
usernames, passwords and credit card details by someone pretend-
ing to be a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication to 
lure the unsuspecting person.  
 POPIA the Protection of Personal Information Act no 4 of 2013; 
PPP  Public Private Partnerships.  
Risk the likelihood of a threat materialising by exploitation of vulnera-
bility; 
R2K the Right to Know Campaign, a non-governmental organisation 
that campaign for freedom of expression and access to infor-
mation. 
SABRIC South African Banking Risk Information Centre, a section 21 
company whose key focus is to combat organised crime. 
Server  a computer used to run programs that provide services to multiple 
users; 
Standard  an essential requirement for the implementation of a specific poli-
cy, procedure or technology;  
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SOPs  standard operating procedures which are instructions to all system 
users, administrators and managers on the procedures required to 
ensure the correct operation of a system; 
SSA  the State Security Agency, a department of State responsible for 
State Security.  
System integrity the ability of a system to prevent the circumvention or bypassing 
of its security mechanisms; 
System Owner  a Manager ultimately accountable for the performance of the 
business process executed via a particular ICT system. The Sys-
tem owner is ultimately responsible for the functionality of the 
system; 
TCY the Cybercrime committee of the Council of Europe responsible 
for the implementation of the Budapest convention. 
 Threat any potential event or act, deliberate or accidental, that could 
cause injury to persons, compromise the integrity of information 
or could cause the loss or damage of assets;  
UNODC  the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
RICA  the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision 
of Communication-related Information Act, 2002  
User  Anyone with authorised access to an ICT system;  
Verification activities related to the identification of the origin or the integrity 
of an electronic communications product, system or service;  
Vulnerability  a deficiency related to security that could permit a threat to mate-
rialise.  
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3 ABSTRACT 
Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs), in particular interconnected 
computer and related digital systems, create opportunities for innovation, competitive-
ness and economic growth. These technologies also expose key sectors of the economy 
such as banking, telecommunications, manufacturing, emergency services, transporta-
tion, energy, and social services to new security risks and threats. 
This security challenge has given rise to a need for the adoption of appropriate strategies 
to secure critical information systems commonly referred to as Critical Information In-
frastructures or CIIs. The European Union defines CIIs as ICT systems that are critical 
and essential for the operation of Critical Infrastructures, such as telecommunications, 
computers, the internet, and communications satellites. The African Union has defined 
CIIs as the cyber infrastructures essential to vital services for public safety, economic 
stability, national security, international stability, and the sustainability and restoration 
of critical cyberspace. 
Given their complexity and sophistication, CIIs are increasingly owned or operated by 
the private sector, and governments generally purchase these services on behalf of the 
general public. This interdependence between the public and private sectors calls for 
structured co-operation aimed at ensuring the security and uninterrupted availability of 
CIIs.  
This study examines the extent to which South Africa’s public policies for securing CIIs 
promote co-operation between the government and the private sector. It includes a liter-
ature review which shows that policy aimed at promoting and regulating public-private 
cooperation is a key element of efforts to secure CIIs and combat cybercrime in Europe, 
the Americas and Asia. 
The report also shows that the Council of Europe, through the Budapest Convention, 
has played a central role in creating a legal framework for combating cybercrime and 
promoting public- private cooperation on cybersecurity. 
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Research also shows that not much has been done in Africa to combat cybercrime. 
Some initiatives have been undertaken by Senegal, Morocco, South Africa and Mauri-
tius. These countries are members of the Budapest Convention, and participated in initi-
atives of the Council of Europe in their capacity as members of the Convention. 
In 2014, the AU adopted the AU Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Pro-
tection. This convention has only been signed by eight of 54 African countries, and has 
not entered into force because it has not been ratified by the required number of coun-
tries. This means that there is no valid instrument for promoting cooperation on cyber 
security in Africa. 
Since 2002, the South African government has adopted various policies and laws aimed 
at promoting cooperation with the private sector. However, there is no evidence of these 
policies or legislation being implemented. The research also shows that the government 
has failed to develop a consistent strategy for implementing policy in this field. 
In 2015, the government approved the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework 
(NCPF), which calls for public–private partnerships and cooperation. However, the re-
search shows that it has not adopted a strategy that will allow this approach to succeed. 
In this regard, the research report points to the 5C protocol as a useful guide to success-
ful policy implementation.  
In interviews conducted for this study, senior government officials acknowledge that, as 
in many other areas of governance, good policy has been made, but implementation is 
lagging. 
The study concludes with recommendations for improving cyber security in South Afri-
ca. These include fast-tracking the Cybersecurity and Cybercrimes Bill, which has been 
tabled in Parliament; developing and institutionalising a policy implementation frame-
work in line with the 5C protocol; and developing the required skills and capacity to 
institutionalise and structure cooperation between the government the private sector in 
identifying and protecting CIIs, and pursuing a regional approach to cybersecurity.  
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4  CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION  
4.1 Background  
Rapidly development of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) contin-
ue to have a positive impact on the provision of social services as well as economic de-
velopment throughout the world. While this is welcome, rapid technological changes 
are also presenting public policy as well as regulatory and legal frameworks with un-
precedented challenges, notably by requiring more structured partnerships between gov-
ernment and the private sector.  
These partnerships are needed because most of these systems, which form the backbone 
of contemporary social services, are owned or operated by the private sector. Like all 
major computer systems, they are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. These services are also 
highly sensitive, and disruptions could have far-reaching social and financial conse-
quences. Therefore, a key aspect of public-private collaboration involves identifying 
and protecting what has become known as Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs). 
This study investigates the extent to which South Africa’s public policies, laws and reg-
ulations aimed at identifying and securing CIIs are promoting cooperation between the 
government and the private sector. 
As noted by Timothy Shaw (2004), the resurgence of civic protest in virtually all sub-
Saharan African countries since the late 1980s has resulted in the transformation of the 
continent’s governance and political systems, with civic groups in most of these coun-
tries demanding that their governments be democratic, transparent and accountable. 
While much has been achieved, much remains to be done in this regard for Africa to 
have an effective and vibrant civil society which plays a meaningful role in governance. 
Ndlangisa (2009) and Assaf (2008) point out that most successful policies for securing 
CIIs involve collaboration between the public and private sectors. The need to transform 
and adapt governance and political systems has been accelerated by technological inno-
vations and developments which have influenced the provision of essential services 
such as electricity, emergency services, health care, water, food, communications, fi-
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nancial services and social security. This has forced governments to introduce more in-
clusive processes for managing these processes and their security, involving both the 
private sector and civil society. 
Globally interconnected technology has introduced a new public policy dimension, re-
quiring collaboration with the private sector and civil society about the provision of es-
sential services. This is because the ICT systems that are central to providing these ser-
vices are often owned or operated by the private sector. 
Citizens do not always concern themselves with the processes involved in providing es-
sential services, but want their governments to ensure that they are available and acces-
sible. Any government which fails to ensure that these services are provided in an effi-
cient and effective way is likely to lose the confidence of voters.  
At the same time, government relies on the private sector to provide these services, be-
cause the information systems that provide access to essential services are either owned 
or operated on a commercial basis by the private sector. For government to provide 
these services efficiently, it has to have some working relationship with the private sec-
tor. 
Pasquale (2011) points to the need for greater transparency following the global finan-
cial crises from 2007 onwards, marked by undisclosed risks to financial institutions, and 
argues that this has raised the need for an appropriate balance between transparency and 
secrecy in relation to securing CIIs. Kirtley (2006) also argues that government’s desire 
to prevail over its adversaries must not be achieved at the expense of transparency and 
accountability. 
As a result of technological innovations and developments, these services now rely on 
the effective functioning of a range of ICT systems, from generation through storage to 
transmission to the end user. This has led to governments intensifying their efforts to 
develop public policies and regulatory frameworks for ensuring that CIIs are protected 
against illegal or unauthorised access or intrusion.  
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According to Dunn-Cavelty and Suter (2009), there is general consensus, at least in the 
developed world, that these technological innovations have improved access to essential 
services, but have also created a public policy and national security challenge in that 
they expose society to a range of cyber threats. According to the Right to Know Cam-
paign (2015), while technological innovations are forcing governments to establish 
structured relations with the private sector, the latter is sceptical about working with 
government as it is not very transparent about national security matters. As a result, the 
private sector is demanding greater transparency and accountability from government. 
However, many governments remain committed to the traditional approach of blanket 
secrecy about all matters involving national security, including CIIs. 
Public comments on South Africa’s Protection of State Information Bill show clearly 
that both the private sector and civil society are opposed to blanket secrecy, and see this 
as a tool for advancing or concealing undemocratic governance (Corruption Watch, 
2012; HESA, 2012). The conflict between government and the private sector about 
these issues is further complicated by the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), 
which entrenches the rights of freedom of expression, privacy, and access to infor-
mation held by the state, and requires the security services to be subject to civilian au-
thority and the rule of law. These sections provide the private sector, civil society and 
individual citizens with a legal framework for resisting government interference, and 
demanding more transparent and accountable government. 
In this digital age, partnerships between government and the private sector are vital for 
protecting the accessibility and integrity of social services. Governments, globally, are 
preoccupied with making and implementing policy for combating cybercrime directed 
at national CIIs. Clark (1999) argues that CIIs in the private sector, including those used 
in managing banking, finance, railways, aviation, electricity, and gas and fuel pipelines, 
involve computer networks that are also not secured against cyber-attacks. He further 
notes that those networks are penetrated on a regular basis by hackers and sometimes by 
foreign powers, and that protecting them also requires a partnership between govern-
ment and the private sector. This view is supported by various experts, including Suter 
(2007), Muhaya (2010) and Kyoung-Sik Min (2015). 
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South Africa has taken various steps to develop a policy and regulatory framework for 
securing its CIIs. The National Strategic Intelligence Act (no 39 of 1994) defines CIIs 
as electronic communications held by organs of state which are necessary for the pro-
tection of the national security of the Republic, and defines ‘critical electronic commu-
nications infrastructure’ as electronic communications products or systems used to 
transmit and store or transmit or store critical electronic communications. 
Policy and regulatory initiatives include the Electronic and Transactions Act (no 25 of 
2002), which provide for the registration of cryptographic service providers, an accredi-
tation authority, the accreditation of authenticated products and services, and the identi-
fication and security of critical state databases (Act no 25 of 2002). More recently, the 
government has approved a National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF), which 
was published in December 2015. Inter alia, it deals with the identification and security 
of the CIIs. 
In 2015, the government published a Critical Infrastructure Protection Bill for public 
comment, and this Bill has not been introduced in Parliament as yet. Its contents are not 
clear on the issue of Government and private sector cooperation. The NCPF notes that 
significant proportions of South Africa’s CIIs are in private hands, or are operated on a 
commercial basis. This creates a need for institutionalised and entrenched cooperation 
between the public and private sectors about identifying and securing those infrastruc-
tures. The policy framework further outlines a strategy for protecting national CIIs, 
which, it says, should include clear information security procedures, access control and 
authentication, measures for the secure storage and archiving of critical databases, inci-
dent monitoring, and physical security measures.  
The NCPF also calls for the adoption of international standards for securing CIIs. Mo-
hammed (2015), among others, emphasises the importance of adopting such standards. 
He states that they help states and business to protect CIIs, and respond to and recover 
from cyber-attacks. The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has devel-
oped standards for information security which deal with information security policies, 
risk management, human resource security, cryptography, access control, compliance, 
and business continuity measures (ISO 27001). Some of these standards have been in-
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corporated into the NCPF. They provide a basis for cooperation between government 
and the private sector on information security. 
In 2016, the South African government also tabled the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity 
Bill, which provides a framework for identifying and adopting measures for securing 
CIIs. This Bill has been introduced in the National Assembly, but has not yet been 
passed or promulgated into law. 
These policy and legislative processes have allowed the private sector to state its views 
about the proposed identification and protection of national CIIs. Among other things, it 
has allowed the major private sector entities which are likely to be declared NCIIs in 
terms of pending legislation to comment on the extent to which they are prepared to co-
operate with government in identifying and securing NCIIs.  
This researcher has consulted government and private sector role players in this regard. 
As noted earlier, developing policy and legislative framework on identifying and secur-
ing NCIIs rests on a cooperative model. However, there is no current evidence of struc-
tured cooperation, and the model is still being contested, with government still follow-
ing the traditional national security approach, while the private sector is demanding 
greater transparency and accountability 
Inter alia, the private sector regards government policies on secrecy as an attempt to 
conceal government inefficiency and protect corrupt officials. Numerous private sector 
entities have objected to the Protection of State Information Bill. This centres on oppo-
sition to what is regarded as government attempts to protect all state information, in-
cluding information with little or no impact on national security. 
4.2 Problem statement 
Government has an overarching responsibility for ensuring the uninterrupted provision 
of essential services such as water, health, food, emergency, energy, telecommunica-
tions, transport and financial services. This responsibility is often expressed in constitu-
tions and in subsequent policy, legislation and regulations. 
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As in many other areas, ICTs play a growing role in providing essential services. For 
this reason, these systems have become known as Critical Information Infrastructures 
(CIIs). Due to their increasing complexity and sophistication, many CIIs are owned and 
operated by the private sector. Government’s growing dependence on these systems has 
introduced a new public policy dimension in that it needs to collaborate with the private 
sector as well as civil society to secure and protect these CIIs. The development of such 
policy and legislative framework in South Africa rests on such a cooperative model.  
However, the private sector and civil society are contesting aspects of this framework, 
and there is no evidence of current collaboration between government and the private 
sector. Instead, relations are marked by hostility and a lack of trust. This lack of cooper-
ation is not building confidence in the secure use of CIIs.  
In 2014, a SABRIC report stated that cybercrime was costing South Africa approxi-
mately R1 billion a year. Reported cybercrimes and their negative impact on the provi-
sion of essential services provide additional evidence of the need for structured coopera-
tion between the government and the private sector. Cybercrimes include phishing, a 
fraudulent way of acquiring sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and 
credit card details, and card skimming, aimed at capturing data from the magnetic stripe 
on the back of ATM cards. Hacking, gaining unauthorised access to computer systems 
and data, is also reported to be on the rise. Some cybercrime are non-financial and are 
aimed at giving hostile nations a competitive advantage. This includes the theft of intel-
lectual property, and cyber espionage. 
The current lack of cooperation between the government and the private sector is com-
promising the security of South Africa’s NCIIs, including those involved in providing 
essential services. This poses a social, economic and national security threat to the con-
stitutional order of the Republic. Hostile nations or other elements could exploit this 
situation to their own advantage. The private sector views the state’s involvement in in-
formation security as censorship (Radu 2015), an attempt to prevent the free flow of in-
formation (HESA, 2012) or an attempt to restrict access to information (Cosatu, 2012; 
Helen Suzman Foundation, 2012).  
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Among other things, private sector and civil society role players argue that the govern-
ment should not become involved in internet security, including limiting access to the 
internet, and that internet security should be a shared responsibility involving a range of 
stakeholders. 
4.3 Purpose statement  
The purpose of this study is to examine the need for structured cooperation between the 
South African government and the private sector as an effective tool for the implemen-
tation of public policy on the identification and security of the CIIs. It also seeks to 
identify some of the underlying causes of the lack of structured cooperation between the 
government and the private sector. 
It will seek to make a case for structured cooperation on two main grounds. The first is 
that a failure to secure South Africa’s CIIs poses a serious threat to national security, 
and may undermine national welfare and socio-economic development. Given this, eve-
ry South African citizen has a role to play in ensuring the security of NCIIs. 
In this context, the study examines the current policy and legislative framework to as-
sess whether it provides an effective model for structured cooperation between govern-
ment and private sector. 
4.4 Research questions  
The research addresses the following questions:  
1. What are the existing policies, laws and regulations for protecting and securing 
South Africa’s CIIs? Do they promote structured cooperation between the govern-
ment and the private sector, and are they being implemented?  
2. What should be done to achieve an appropriate balance between secrecy, transpar-
ency and accountability in securing CIIs?  
3. Could the adoption of relevant ISO standards assist in promoting closer cooperation 
between the government and the private sector?  
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5 CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.1 Introduction  
This report discusses government policy and legislation on securing and protecting CIIs, 
and the extent to which it adopts structured cooperation between the government and 
the private sector as a viable model for the implementation of the public policy on secu-
rity of the CIIs. It specifically examines the extent to which government may have pro-
moted cooperation between itself and the private sector in view of the fact the most CIIs 
are either owned or operated on a commercial basis by the private sector (Van Solms 
and Van Niekerk, 2013). Given that the protection of CIIs is a growing global issue, the 
research also compares the dispensation in South Africa with those in other countries. 
This study acknowledges that this is a complex subject in that it involves values held by 
the state and society that are traditionally regarded as inimical, but have become inter-
twined due to technological developments. CIIs are physical and cyber based systems 
essential for the minimum operation of key economic and government sectors in a given 
country (Council of Europe, 2001). 
They are regarded as critical because they ensure that all infrastructures which provide 
essential social services operate effectively and efficiently. Any vulnerability, unavaila-
bility, incapacity or destruction of these infrastructures can have a severe and even dis-
astrous impact on the wellbeing of a nation. Essential services such as financial ser-
vices, emergency services, transport, social welfare, energy, food processing, water, 
sanitation and electricity now rely on ICTs. 
The South African government regards the protection of CIIs as an integral part of its 
national security mandate. As a result, it views this as the exclusive preserve of the ex-
ecutive arm of the state, particularly those agencies with the authority to deal with mat-
ters of security. While it may allow the private sector to persuade it otherwise, it will not 
be easy to convince state security policy-makers of the need for broad stakeholder con-
sultation on matters of national security. In the past, when technology was less connect-
ed, it was easier to maintain linkages between technologies viewed as serving national 
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security interests and those that created linkages between the government and the pri-
vate sector.  
Given higher levels of connectivity, it has become practically impossible to retain the 
boundary between technologies used by government and the private sector in the course 
of providing essential services, and protecting them against unauthorized access. Today, 
they are commonly embedded in one device that is commercially available. This has 
created a new public policy challenge surrounding the provision of services that are vi-
tal to the socio-economic order and national security of the Republic. 
Making policy for securing CIIs is more difficult in countries with no existing coopera-
tion between government and the private sector, because most of the relevant infor-
mation systems are owned and operated by the latter. This situation becomes even more 
difficult in the case of companies with a global footprint, or companies based elsewhere. 
Concerns are often expressed about the security of the technologies they provide to 
countries with which they only have a commercial relationship, and whether they can be 
trusted not to provide their countries of origin with a competitive advantage in this re-
gard. 
A national interest debate also arises around the issue of whether structured cooperation 
between a government and a multinational company does not amount to exposing the 
technical abilities of the country in question to a foreign entity whose commitment to its 
national development can be questioned. Despite this, engaging with a range of stake-
holders has become a key element of policies for identifying and securing CIIs. Brynard 
(2007) argues that public policy development and implementation is no longer the ex-
clusive preserve of government, with the private sector and civil society playing little or 
no role. He further states that public policy implementation is a complex process affect-
ed by a range of variables deriving from different perspectives, political systems and 
economic capacities.  
In this perspective, successful policy implementation becomes less about the number of 
votes captured by a ruling party, and more about capacity, commitment, and coalitions 
of interest (Brynard, 2005). The ability to build alliances and share political power 
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among a range of stakeholders differs from country to country, and depends upon the 
abilities of different governments to rise above political differences for the greater good 
of the country. In this regard, this report analyses the different approaches adopted by 
various countries in building public and private sector alliances for implementing poli-
cies such as securing CIIs.  
5.2 CIIs and cybercrime 
According to the NCPF, the borderless nature of cyberspace and the interconnectivity of 
information networks offer vast opportunities for innovation, competitiveness and eco-
nomic growth, but also provide unprecedented scope for cyber-attacks on countries, or-
ganisations and individuals, particularly attacks directed at NCIIs. 
According to SABRIC (2016), there has been a significant increase in reported incidents 
of cybercrime directed at South African Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and strategic 
installations, as well as cyber espionage attacks. While South Africa is in the process of 
developing a policy and legislative framework for identifying and protecting CIIs, it is 
still not being implemented, and elements of the proposed framework are still being 
contested by important stakeholders. 
Experts generally agree that the bulk of criminal activity has shifted to cyberspace. In 
recent years, cybercrime, particularly those directed at CIIs, has escalated. Global cy-
bercrimes are mainly crimes directed at national CIIs, requiring nation-states to take ap-
propriate policy, regulatory and technical steps to protect and secure their CIIs. The 
borderless and transnational nature of cybercrime complicates attempts by nation-states 
to secure their CIIs, forcing them to seek bilateral and multilateral agreements that pro-
mote international cooperation in the fight against cybercrime. Put differently, it has be-
come vital for nation states to seek international cooperation on combating cybercrime. 
The leading international instrument for combating cybercrime is the Convention on 
Cybercrime, developed by the Council of Europe. Also known as the Budapest Conven-
tion, it provides guidelines for developing national responses to cybercrime, as well as a 
framework for international cooperation. 
Government and private sector cooperation on security of Critical information Infrastruc-
tures 
 
Page 22 of 80 
The Council of Europe is an international organisation aimed at upholding human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe, and promoting European culture. It 
works mainly by drafting conventions or treaties which set common legal standards for 
its member states. However, several of its conventions have been opened to non-
member states. This includes the Convention on Cybercrime, which has also been 
signed by Canada, Japan, South Africa and the United States. 
The Convention was adopted in 2001, and entered into force in 2004. By December 
2016, 52 states had ratified the convention, while a further four states had signed the 
convention but not ratified it. South Africa was one of the first non-European countries 
to sign the convention, and has been participating in its implementation. Membership of 
the Convention is open to all nations of the world. The Council of Europe is actively 
marketing the Convention, and providing technical support and funding to new mem-
bers.  
The United Nations, through the UNODC, is also engaged in initiatives to develop an 
international instrument for promoting cybersecurity. One of the outcomes of this pro-
cess is a comprehensive global report on country initiatives to build legislative and 
technical capacity to fight cybercrime (UNODC, 2013). Besides this, no other signifi-
cant activity by the UN has been reported, and the Budapest Convention remains the 
only binding international instrument on this issue. 
Members of the cybercrime committee of the Council of Europe are reluctant to support 
the UN initiatives on the grounds that it took the Council almost 10 years to negotiate 
the convention, and another 10 years to start implementing it. Given this, they argue it 
would be pointless for the UN to negotiate a similar convention rather promoting the 
existing one. They argue that a UN convention may be dictated by political considera-
tions rather than focusing on defeating cybercrime, which remains a major security 
threat to global peace and economic development. They also argue that it is more im-
portant to build the technical capacity of member states to implement the existing con-
vention than to develop new international instruments (TCY Report, 2016) 
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South Africa is one of few African countries that have participated in the Council of Eu-
rope convention capacity-building initiatives. Importantly, the Budapest Convention 
promotes cooperation between national governments and the private sector in combat-
ing cybercrime and ensuring the secure use of ICT. It also commits its members to help-
ing to develop international criminal policy on cybercrime, and fostering international 
cooperation.  
South Africa has also benefited from GLACY (Global Action on Cybercrime), a joint 
project of the European Union and the Council of Europe aimed at assisting countries 
worldwide to implement the Budapest Convention. Its specific objective was to ‘enable 
criminal justice authorities to engage in international cooperation on cybercrime and 
electronic evidence on the basis of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime’. 
The project ran from November 2013 to October 2016. It has been succeeded by GLACY+, 
an extension project for supporting seven priority countries in Africa and the Asia-
Pacific region, namely Mauritius, Morocco, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka and Tonga. The idea is that countries should also serve as hubs for sharing their 
experiences in their respective regions. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
are also benefiting from project support. 
Under the GLACY project, South Africa was assisted to develop various legal and insti-
tutional measures for combating cybercrime, including the Cybersecurity and Cyber-
crimes Bill, the Standard Operating Procedures for cybercrime investigation and prose-
cution, and the training of prosecutors and judges (GLACY, 2016). Glacy+ was due to 
start at the beginning of 2017 and continue for four years until 2020. It is aimed at fur-
ther building the capacity of member states to combat cybercrime. The other notable 
achievement of the capacity building initiatives of the Budapest convention is the pub-
lic-private cooperation in the implementation of the various training initiatives. Most of 
the different delegations from the member states consisted of experts on cybersecurity 
matters both from the Public and private sector entities in those countries. 
As noted, the Budapest Convention and GLACY emphasise the importance of coopera-
tion between the public and private sectors for dealing with cybercrime. Cooperation is 
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not limited to nation states only but is broadened to include global cooperation against 
cybercrime. 
At its plenary meeting in 2013, the Cybercrime Committee adopted guidance notes to 
member states for implementing the provisions of the Budapest convention relevant to 
the protection of CII. They provide member states with advice on defining offences, 
gathering evidence, instituting prosecutions and imping penalties. 
The Budapest Convention defines CIIs as those systems and assets, ‘whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to a country that their improper functioning, incapacity or destruction 
would have a debilitating impact on national security and defence, economic security, 
public health or safety or any combination of those matters’. It notes that, while coun-
tries may define CIIs in different ways, member states generally accept that they involve 
services such as food, water, energy, transport, communications, finance, industry and 
defence, in both the public and private sectors. 
The guidance notes deal with illegal access (Article 2), illegal interception (Article 3), 
data interference (Article 4), systems interference (Article 5), computer-related forgery 
(Article 7), computer-related fraud (Article 8), aiding and abetting (Article 11), and 
sanctions (Article 13). According to the guidance notes, these articles should be used to 
combat cybercrime directed at CIIs, and inform international cooperation. In addition, 
members of the Budapest Convention may develop laws and procedures for combating 
crimes directed at CIIs guided by these articles. 
In 2014, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) 
published a benchmark report entitled Methodologies for the Identification of Critical 
Information Infrastructure Assets and Services. Based on a survey of current practice in 
European countries, the study was aimed at providing guidelines for charting electronic 
data communication networks prior to improving their security. 
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The report demonstrates the extent to which public-private partnerships (PPPs) have 
drastically improved the legal and technical capacity of member states to fight cyber-
crime. Most European countries had established structures comprising both government 
and private sector role players to develop systems for identifying and protecting CIIs.  
The report provides a summary of the methods adopted by European countries for iden-
tifying and protecting CIIs. It also notes that CIIs are increasingly dependent on com-
puter systems for a variety of information management, communications and control 
functions, and that effective public-private collaboration is vital for identifying and pro-
tecting CII assets and services. Common methods used to identify CIIs include the fol-
lowing: 
Identifying critical sectors of the economy: This process entails defining critical sec-
tors, subsectors and services that are essential for the health, safety, security, and eco-
nomic and social well-being of a nation. A risk assessment is performed to determine 
the impact of the unavailability, destruction or impairment of a given service on eco-
nomic wellbeing and national security.  
Identifying the critical and severity impact of services in the economy: This process 
takes into account the extended unavailability, impairment or malfunctioning of a CII, 
and its impact on any or all of the listed vital services.  
 
 Rating the extent of the impact: Severity levels are used to rate the extent of the im-
pact. Maximum severity reflects grave damage to services critical to the socio-economic 
order and national security. Moderate severity reflects a higher level of tolerance and 
therefore lower costs of interruption, provided the functions in question are restored 
within a certain time frame. Moderate severity would cause ‘serious damage’ to vital 
services. Minimum severity means that specific functions of the electronic communica-
tions system can be performed manually, at a tolerable cost and for an extended period 
of time. Minimum severity will ‘cause damage’ or ‘be prejudicial’ to vital services.  
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Assessing the roles of owners or operators: The owners and operators of CIIs are re-
sponsible for determining the core processes, applications, and network assets and ser-
vices used to operate the systems in question. The report summarises the initiatives un-
dertaken by European countries to develop national cybersecurity strategies, notably 
those featuring public-private collaboration. These initiatives are summarised in Table 
1. 
Table 1: Sample of European countries with PPP arrangements in respect of CIIs 
COUNTRY POLICY/LAW STRUCTURES PUBLIC/PRIVATE COOPERATION 
SLOVENIA National Cyber Security 
strategy 
Slovenian Ministry of defence (re-
sponsible for critical infrastructure in 
Slovenia)  
National Cyber Security Authority 





Trust relationship between critical infrastructure 
owners/operators, National Cyber Security Au-
thority and also Intelligence agency/agencies. 
Mixed ownership of CIIs. Public ownership is 15 
% of sub-sectors. 




Spanish Law 8/2011 
EU legislation on protec-
tion of CIIs 
Royal Decree 704/2011  
National Cyber Security 
Strategy  
 
Secretary of State - Ministry for Home 
Affairs  
National Security Council.  
Cyber Coordination Office  
Industry (CERTS) 
CERT for Security 
National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion, strategic approach and State responsibility 
includes both the Public and private sector focus. 
Sectorial Strategic Plans for all sectors of the 
economy.  
Critical operators have to develop Operator Se-




Law on Cyber Security Ministry of Interior (to develop CII 
identification methodology)  
Cyber Security Council (consists of 
public, private sectors and academia)  
National Cyber Security Centre 
(NCSC)  
State Data Protection Inspectorate  
Contact points for cyber security (des-
ignated by CI owners) 
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) as the 
authority responsible for CIIP.  
CII owners shall inform National Cybersecurity 
centre, State data protection inspectorate, police 
about cyber incidents.  
CII owners shall designate contact points re-
sponsible for cyber security  
CII owners shall develop, implement and exer-
cise their cyber incident management plans. 
ESTONIA  
 
Emergency Act 2009. 
Cyber Security Strategy. 
 
Ministry of Interior (overall national 
coordinator).  
Cyber Security centre (monitor cyber-
security threats and advise CIIs)  
Information System Authority (law 
enforcement authority). 
CII to conduct annual risk assessments, opera-
tional plan for critical services and report security 
incidents.  
CII operators monitored by the Ministry of Interior 
in the implementation of the security operation 




tection Act (166/2012) 
 
Directorate for disaster Management 
(responsible for identification and 
protection of CIIs)  
CIP Network Safety Centre acting as 
the national security authority.  
CIP CSIRT.  
 
The National Directorate General for Disaster 
Management plays a monitoring, controlling and 
coordination role, and includes the CIP CSIRT. 
The CIP Network Safety Centre was established 
to provide safety and to help the CII operator 
companies to protect themselves against net-




ture Protection Program 
established in terms of the 
Crisis Management Act 
Government Centre for Security re-
sponsible for CIP coordination and 
cooperation between government 
ministry responsible for security and 
CII operators or owners. 
CIP programme created the PPP forum for pri-
vate and public owners of CIP. It develops na-
tional priorities, objectives, and standards for 
effective functioning of critical infrastructure and 
development of detailed criteria for identification 
of CIIS. 
 Source: ENISA (2014) 
As noted earlier, the cybercrime committee of the Council of Europe has undertaken a 
number of initiatives for global action against cybercrime, including training and ca-
pacity-building (GLACY, 2014). Under GLACY, cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies, service providers, and other private sector entities is regarded as essential for 
protecting the rights of Internet users and protecting them against crime. Strategies for 
promoting cooperation between public and private sector entities include: 
• Establishing clear rules and procedures for access by law enforcement agencies to 
data held by service providers and other private sector entities.  
• Fostering a culture of cooperation between law enforcement agencies and service 
providers as well as other private sector entities.  
• Facilitating public--private information sharing across borders. In this regard, gov-
ernments are advised to consider legal mechanisms for establishing structured pub-
lic—private information sharing as well as trans-border measures for access to data, 
including the promotion of more efficient regional and international cooperation.  
• Establishing continuous points of contact through adequate resourcing, training, le-
gal powers and support for proactive cooperation domestically and with foreign 
counterparts, as well as emergency procedures for access to and disclosure of data in 
situations related to risks to life and similar circumstances.  
This clearly demonstrates that cooperation between governments and the private sector 
entities has greatly helped European countries to develop the legal strategies, capacity 
and skills needed to fight cybercrime and secure their CIIs. 
The UNODC global survey on cybercrime and cybersecurity (UNDOC. 2013) agrees 
with the need to identify strategic priorities in the fight against cybercrime. It concludes 
that there is a degree of fragmentation at the international level which does not provide 
a good foundation for international cooperation, caused by different multilateral or bi-
lateral interests which, in some instances, hamper agreements about global instruments 
for combating cybercrime. 
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The report notes that a lack of uniformity among cybercrime laws has a negative impact 
on interstate cooperation, compounded by a lack of uniformity among bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements on various matters relating to cybercrime. In this regard, the report 
notes that the Budapest Convention remains the only international instrument for pro-
moting a common approach to cybercrime. It further argues that while divergent in-
struments legitimately reflect socio-cultural and regional differences, they could lead to 
the emergence of country ‘clusters’ that may not be well matched to the global nature of 
cybercrime. It also argues that traditional methods of international cooperation may not 
provide the timely responses needed to respond to cybercrime, and obtain volatile elec-
tronic evidence. As an increasing number of crimes involve geo-distributed electronic 
evidence, this will become an issue not only for cybercrime, but crimes in general.  
The report raises the issue of trans-border access to data, regarded as a strategic priority 
in implementing the Budapest Convention, and states that the role of evidence ‘location’ 
needs to be reconceptualised, inter alia to obtain consensus on issues surrounding direct 
access to extra-territorial data by law enforcement agencies. 
The report also refers to the need to provide law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and 
the judiciary in developing countries with the technical capacity they need to investigate 
and combat cybercrime. An analysis of current national legal frameworks points to in-
sufficient harmonisation of cybercrime offences, investigative powers, and the admissi-
bility of electronic evidence. 
The issues raised in the UNODC report are being addressed by the Council of Europe in 
the course of its capacity-building project. In fact, the UNODC report appears to con-
firm the Council of Europe argument that developing a new UN convention on cyber-
crime is unlikely to produce a different result to the Budapest Convention and the 
GLACY initiative. 
A cause for concern is that as long as global multilateral institutions do not adopt a 
common approach to the fight against cybercrime, cybercriminals will continue to take 
advantage of these divergent approaches and the resultant fragmentation of international 
efforts to combat cybercrime. Therefore, a united approach to the fight against global 
cybercrime is vital. 
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Given this, and the continued growth in cybercrime, the UN and the Council of Europe 
should agree on an acceptable international mechanism for implementing existing inter-
national instruments such as the Budapest and African Union conventions, with a focus 
on building the capacity of member states. Waiting for a UN instrument is unlikely to be 
a better solution to the current global challenge than to involve as many countries as 
possible in implementing the existing instruments. Cybercrime is increasing at an alarm-
ing rate, particularly targeting countries with little or no capacity to respond to cyber-
crime, and with weak economies and security systems that are vulnerable to attack. 
Given this, the capacity-building initiatives of the Council of Europe is a welcome in-
tervention.  
5.3 Methods for identifying CIIs and public-private partnerships: the 
South African approach  
The initiatives referred to above demonstrate that public-private partnerships (PPPs) are 
an effective strategy for combating cybercrime. Added to this, countries should partici-
pate in global initiatives against cybercrime via international instruments that promote 
cooperation on this matter as well as on information-sharing. 
Adeleke (2014) argues that public-private cooperation is often very complicated, largely 
because of the different political interests of those involved. He believes it is a form of 
participatory democracy in which those who are governed play a significant role in 
holding government accountable, not only by being given access to information, but al-
so by being given a stake in the exercise of state power. In essence, he argues that those 
with the authority to exercise power must agree to the notion that power should be 
shared with the people, in the course of addressing the needs of society. 
As noted previously, approaches to cybersecurity vary, with some countries regarding 
this as an issue involving information systems security only, and others as a matter of 
national security. These approaches determine the extent to which governments involve 
the private sector in their approach to cybersecurity. Governments in the former catego-
ry tend to focus on building the technical capacity needed to secure its critical systems 
against unauthorised access. This would include the adoption of appropriate information 
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security standards. In countries in the latter category, it becomes very difficult for the 
state to learn and share information about best practices with other jurisdictions due to 
the focus on secrecy.  
International initiatives promoting public-private cooperation on securing CIIs against 
cybercrime have been described above. Those initiatives have had a direct impact on 
South Africa, not only due to the escalation of cybercrime, but also because it is a sig-
nificant global economic player. This status and its implications for CII are reflected in 
its membership of the Budapest Convention. Initiatives under the Convention have had 
a direct impact on South Africa’s legislative, regulatory and technical capacity-building 
initiatives, particularly in respect of public-private partnerships. 
This report assesses the policy and regulatory choices by policy-makers in preparing 
South Africa to become a global player in the technology security space. It will also 
look at lessons that may have been learnt by successive South African governments in 
dealing with public-private cooperation in view of the international approach discussed 
above, and taking into account that South Africa is part of the international initiatives to 
promote cybersecurity. 
Public-private cooperation creates an enabling framework for more inclusive govern-
ance and the sharing of the resources. While governments often experience a scarcity of 
skills, they need to develop and implement policies that have far-reaching implications 
for social, economic and national security. Connectivity also had a direct impact on the 
ability of a country to attract foreign direct investments, which are critical for national 
development. All these matters require public-private cooperation aimed at ensuring 
that the country in question is able to attract much-needed foreign direct investment, 
thereby ensuring economic growth. Given this, the NCPF seeks to enhance cybersecuri-
ty, but also accepts that South African cyberspace is vulnerable to attack by global cy-
bercriminals targeting the proper functioning of the CIIs that are vital to the provision of 
essential services. 
In this regard, the NCPF emphasises the importance of balancing measures for promot-
ing cybersecurity with measures aimed at preventing cybercrime. The NCPF states that 
there is a need to find an appropriate balance between the risks associated with the use 
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of information systems and accepting the reality that the use of information technology 
has become a central aspect of service provision in modern societies. The NCPF further 
states that the growing threat of cybercrime due to the vulnerability of CIIs should not 
impede the role of ICTs in stimulating economic growth and national development. It 
goes on to prescribe measures for securing CIIs and protecting them against cybercrime. 
As noted earlier, the global connectivity of information systems requires a paradigm 
shift in dealing with the security of CIIs as most are either owned or operated on a 
commercial basis by private sector entities. Historical data shows that public policy on 
protecting CIIs in South Africa has evolved over time. It was initially dealt with as a 
purely physical infrastructural matter in terms of the National Key Points Act (No 102 
of 1980). The main objective of the Act was to provide for the declaration and security 
of National Key Points. It focused on physical infrastructure rather than on information 
security. In terms of this Act, if the Minister was of the view that any place or area was 
so important that its loss, damage, disruption or immobilization might prejudice the Re-
public, or whenever he considered it necessary or expedient for the safety of the Repub-
lic or in the public interest, it could be declared a National Key Point. The owner would 
then be advised of this in writing. 
He / she would then be required to take appropriate steps to secure the National Key 
point. If the owner refused to do so, or failed to provide the specified protection, the 
Minister could either order him or her to do so, or provide the required protection, or 
require the owner to reimburse the state for the costs involved. The Act did not envisage 
collaboration between the state and the private sector. The state played all the key roles, 
thereby creating the impression that security was the exclusive preserve of government, 
and the Minister in particular. Even the list of National Key Points was kept secret. This 
changed recently when this secrecy was challenged and the courts ordered that the list 
of National Key Points be disclosed, in line with the constitutional right of access to in-
formation held by the state. The application was brought against the Minister of Police 
by the Right to Know Campaign (Right 2 Know and another versus the Minister of Po-
lice, 2014). 
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The National Key Points Act is old order legislation which is now subject to the South 
African constitution of 1996.  This means that all the provisions of this Act which are 
inconsistent with the constitution are invalid and unenforceable. 
After the transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa adopted ICT policies that creat-
ed conducive conditions for innovation and development. Due to these technological 
innovations, critical services such as financial services, emergency services, transport 
services, social welfare services, energy generation, food processing, water, sanitation 
and electricity generation, transmission and distribution are now dependent on ICTs. 
Criminals took advantage of the vulnerability of some electronic systems to launch at-
tacks against countries, organisations or individuals in order to achieve their objectives, 
and South Africa was also a victim of these crimes. Rising cybercrime forced the gov-
ernment to enable law enforcement institutions to deal with cyber related threats, in-
cluding those directed at CIIs. In view of escalating incidents of electronic crimes and 
soon after signing the Budapest Convention in 2001, South Africa initiated a review of 
legislation impacting on cybersecurity, and dealing with the criminalisation of cyber-
related acts.  
 
This process enabled South Africa to respond to the challenge of cybercrime, and to 
comply with the requirements of the Budapest Convention. This included the adoption 
of the Electronic Communications Transactions Act (No 25 of 2002), aimed at creating 
a legal framework for electronic transactions and related security matters. Specifically, 
the Act empowered the relevant Minister of Communications to ‘declare certain classes 
of information which is of importance to the protection of the national security of the 
Republic or the economic and social well-being of its citizens to be critical data’, and to 
establish procedures to be followed for identifying and registering critical databases 
(Sections 53 and 54). The Act also introduced the notion of cybercrime, defined as un-
authorised access to, interception of or interference with data (Section 86), computer 
related extortion, fraud and forgery (Section 87), and aiding and abetting (Section 88). 
The procedures to be followed in declaring certain classes of information as critical data 
is consistent with those followed by the European countries reflected in Table 1. How-
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ever, it does not refer to the private sector, although it was well known at the time that 
most CIIs were owned or operated by the private sector, and it remains unclear how the 
government intended to deal with CIIs in private ownership. In the event, this clause has 
not been invoked since 2002. 
 
Also in 2002, the government passed the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd 
Act (No 68 of 2002). This Act established a government entity responsible for securing 
the critical electronic communications of organs of state. It has since been repealed, but 
it is important to mention that it contained mandates similar to those provided for in the 
ECT Act, but to a different entity. Not much progress was made with the intended pro-
cess of identifying and protecting critical electronic communications and critical elec-
tronic communications infrastructures of organs of state. The other limitation of this Act 
was that it confined the identification of CIIs to Organs of State. This mean that it did 
not cover the bulk of CIIs, which are owned or operated by the private sector. This Act 
was later repealed by the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act (No 11 of 2013) 
and the National Strategic Intelligence Act (No 39 of 1994). This legislation requires the 
Minister of State Security to issue regulations prescribing the processes for protecting 
critical electronic communications against unauthorised access or any technical or relat-
ed threat. 
These regulations have not been published, and it is therefore difficult to assess the ex-
tent to which the Minister will seek to cooperate with the private sector in identifying 
and securing CIIs. Prior to approval of this amendment in 2013, the government initiat-
ed a process for developing a National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (2012). The 
NCPF acknowledges that South Africa, like many other countries, has become depend-
ent on the Internet for governance and other purposes, that the Internet has become in-
dispensable to many South Africans, and will become even more so as more and more 
people access the information highway. Taking into consideration the increase in na-
tional and international bandwidth in South Africa, it notes, cybercrimes and threats will 
continue to increase. These cybercrimes and threats have the potential to impact on na-
tional security and economy. In response, the NCPF seeks to establish public-private 
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partnerships for national and international action plans, ensure the protection of NCIIs, 
and promote a comprehensive legal framework for governing cyberspace.  
To these ends, the NCPF requires the development of a National Critical Information 
Infrastructure Policy dealing with third-party access to NCIIs, access to and authentica-
tion of NCIIs, storage and archiving of critical databases, incident management and 
business continuity, and the physical and technical protection of NCIIs (NCPF, 2012). 
While the private sector has generally accepted most of the proposals in the NCPF, it 
has not supported the proposals for identifying and securing CIIs. Some private sector 
entities have declared their intention to have this proposal declared legally invalid on 
the grounds that it contravenes the constitutional right to privacy. The Banking Council 
of South Africa, which represents most South African banks, argues that the inclusion 
of the private sector within the overly broad definition of state-managed/controlled Na-
tional Critical Information Infrastructures provides cause for concern, as this would re-
sult in significant regulatory, bureaucratic and security overlaps, and potential systemic 
risk to the private sector, let alone significant and potentially unwarranted compliance 
costs (Banking Council of South Africa 2016). It has also recommended that the private 
sector should be removed from this section of the proposed legislation. 
The Association of Fraud Examiners, one of the private sector organisations which 
commented on the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill of 2015, suggested that no pri-
vate sector infrastructure should be designated as NCIIs, as this would be ‘tantamount to 
the nationalisation of these infrastructures’ (Association of Fraud Examiners, 2016). 
Taking these and other private sector views into account, it will be important for the 
government to ensure that cyber policy complies with the constitution. It would be diffi-
cult or impossible for the government to build a productive partnership with the private 
sector if the latter feels that its policies and strategies infringe the constitutional rights of 
private sector entities. Any policy that seeks to promote public-private cooperation 
should conform to the constitution. It is not immediately clear whether the government 
failed to implement the 2002 laws because it realised that it would have to negotiate the 
implementation of these policies from a position of weakness. 
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The other major problem is the government’s approach to policy development and im-
plementation. It appears to approach this from a ‘big brother’ position, using its majori-
tarian authority to compel the private sector to comply with policies that may be diffi-
cult to implement, or when private sector procedures would have been a better option. 
This approach reduces the role of the private sector to that of commenting on govern-
ment plans, with the latter having the right to decide whether to agree with these com-
ments or dismiss them outright. Ultimately, this approach does not benefit the govern-
ment, but weakens its ability to involve the private sector in policy implementation. As 
argued by Adeleke (2014), effective participatory democracy strengthens government 
even in cases where its proposals could be legally challenged on the grounds that they 
conflict with private and individual rights.  
From a narrow perspective, the current proposals for state-private collaboration in iden-
tifying and securing CIIs may be seen as interfering with the rights of the owners of the 
private sector entities in question. From a broader perspective, these entities may be re-
garded as providing a vital service which, if compromised, altered or destroyed, would 
have grave national consequences. It becomes very difficult for the government to seek 
the support of private sector or non-government entities when its approach is not guided 
by some form of participatory democracy that is guided by a desire to serve the broader 
national interest rather than a narrow majoritarian one. Once a government becomes 
technical in its interpretation of its right to majoritarianism, it loses credibility among 
members of society who did not necessary vote for it but were prepared to accept it as a 
legitimate authority. In such a case, private sector or non-governmental entities tend to 
rely on the courts to reinterpret government policy. This not only delays policy imple-
mentation, but deprives the government of vital technical support that may be in the 
hands of the private sector.  
 
Brynard (2005) concurs with this view, and submits that the government should consid-
er observing the so-called 5C protocol in implementing policy, namely content, context, 
commitment, capacity and clients/coalitions. It may be argued that the content and con-
text of the NCPF policy is responding to the needs of the stakeholders in so far as the 
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need for a policy mechanism to deal with Cybersecurity issues in South Africa. Issues 
of the means and measures adopted to achieve the policy objectives are informed by 
content. Mtshali (2014) also argues that context provides institutional understanding on 
where and how the policy operates or travels and therefore the implementation of policy 
may also depends on whether the policy is consistent with applicable laws and the con-
stitutional arrangements.  
 She submits that all of these matters become very relevant in the implementation of the 
policy. Commitment addresses issues of implementers and their attitude (willingness 
and ability) towards implementation. Capacity informs on the existence or non-
existence of administrative and other capabilities for doing the job. It therefore becomes 
important to ensure that for policy implementers to take into account that importance of 
the support or lack thereof of clients and coalition in the implementation of public poli-
cy and how such support or lack thereof affects actors in promoting or frustrating im-
plementation. 
 Despite the policy requirement for government and private sector cooperation in the 
identification and security of the CIIs, government has not been able to implement this 
policy because of lack of stakeholder participatory approach due in part to government 
failure to consider broader views of all stakeholders. This has made it impossible to im-
plement this policy on the security of the CIIs. There is no guarantee that the section on 
the security of the CIIs in the current Cybersecurity and Cybercrimes Bill (2016) will be 
successfully implemented taking into account the comments of some of the members of 
the private sector referred to above. It is likely that these policy provisions will be chal-
lenged in Court by the private sector because a culture of national unity and common 
national interests has not created by the relevant authorities.  
5.4 Secrecy, transparency and accountability 
The credibility of those with the authority to govern depends on how they exercise the 
power given to them by the governed, and their willingness to share this power with cit-
izens. This lies at the heart of participatory democracy. Those in power who rely on ma-
joritarianism in exercising their powers will be constantly challenged in the courts be-
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cause of the breakdown of trust between the governing and the governed (Cosatu, 
2012). Issues of secrecy, accountability and transparency become areas of disagreement 
between the government, the private sector and civil society, with the latter two fighting 
for more transparent and accountable policy implementation, while the government 
would prefer to maintain secrecy, particularly in respect of issues related to national se-
curity. As noted earlier, private sector and non-government entities have contested as-
pects of government policy relating to information security (Helen Suzman Foundation, 
2012). Issues of national security and right of access to information have been central to 
the recent mistrust and contestation between government and the private sector.  
The government has not undertaken any visible initiatives to reach out to the private 
sector and civil society in order to achieve a common understanding of issues relating to 
national security. Parties have repeatedly gone to court in an effort to resolve this im-
passe, which is tantamount to asking the courts to resolve issues what should really be 
dealt with by the executive. Majoritarianism leads to a credibility deficit among other 
social role players. While it would have been ideal for government and the private sec-
tor to cooperate and secure identified CIIs for the greater good of citizens, this does not 
seem possible in the current climate in which trust between the two key stakeholders 
seems to have broken down. 
This has happened despite the fact that it is vital for these two parties to agree on an ap-
propriate balance between secrecy and transparency in respect of identifying and secur-
ing CIIs. The interests of both stakeholders will be best served by secured CIIs able to 
deliver essential services without interruption. In the case of the Right 2 know Cam-
paign versus Minister of Police (December, 2014), the Right to Know campaign suc-
ceeded in getting a court order to compel the Minster of Police to disclose the list of de-
clared National Key Points under the National Key Points Act. In a judgment handed 
down in December 2014, Judge Roland Sutherland ruled that the refusal by the Minister 
of Police to release the demanded list of the declared National Key points was unlawful 
and unconstitutional. He further stated that ‘It is wholly unsatisfactory that political of-
fice bearers and senior civil servants should have to perform their duties under a cloud 
of suspicion of incompetence or dishonesty. Transparency about all the facts is neces-
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sary to either repair the rot, if any exists, or dispel the lack of confidence which the citi-
zenry will continue to nurse if the facts are concealed.’  
 
Even though transparency is an important democratic tool for enforcing accountability, 
it also creates ‘political winners and losers’ (Berliner, 2015). It creates political winners 
within the groups in power, and the groups outside power. Those in power would ordi-
narily want to have a controlled transparency so as to avoid a situation where the short-
comings of government are laid bare in the public. This would be political suicide in 
that the government would have given ammunition to its opposition to campaign for its 
removal from power.  
Berliner (2015) further argues that limited transparency allows groups in power to main-
tain privileged control over government information for themselves and their allies, 
thereby monopolising opportunities. By contrast, full transparency gives all groups and 
individuals equal access to government information, thereby creating a level playing 
field for monitoring officials and holding them accountable. Even in cases where gov-
ernments would benefit from private sector assistance, they often refuse to bring the 
private sector on board, mainly due to political considerations. This is often due to sus-
picions that the private sector entities in question may be aligned to opposition parties, 
and provide them with access to sensitive information. Opposition parties are also polit-
ically opportunistic, because they tend to use the private sector in order to gain an in-
sight into government inefficiency for their own political benefit. 
This political contest is problematic when it touches on matters with social, economic 
and national security consequences. Members of the public would prefer politicians to 
bury their political differences in these instances, for the greater good of the nation. Ad-
eleke (2014) contests the idea that transparency and access to information promotes 
trust between the government, the private sector and civil society. According to him, 
this narrative assumes that the ‘distrust of government arises firstly as a result of lack of 
information, and when such information is disseminated, such information is devoid of 
manipulation by the discloser and that disseminated information is used in a particular 
form of rational way to formulate a particular public opinion that constitutes a form of 
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democratic surveillance’  This view is consistent with what really happens when pro-
tests continue for an indefinite period despite government releasing information to justi-
fy its inability to meet the obligations of civil society and the same applies more fre-
quently when negotiations over salary increases break down between government and 
employee representatives on the grounds of mistrust between the negotiators, regardless 
of how much information would have been given to the employee representatives to 
show the government’s inability to meet their demands. 
Adeleke (2014) further argues that the development of participatory democracy cannot 
be judged only on the basis of access to information and transparency, but also on the 
relations of trust built when those in power are willing to share power with those who 
are governed, particularly on matters that define the national interests of a country.  
While the government has introduced various policies and laws since 2002, they have 
not been implemented, largely because the 5C protocol has not been observed. Govern-
ment needs to accept that the owners/operators of CIIs should themselves address the 
security of their assets and the continuity of their business (Australia-New Zealand 
Counter Terrorism Committee, 2015). The survey of successful European approaches to 
securing CIIs reflected in Table 1 shows that public-private cooperation has played a 
central role. This explains why South Africa has struggled to implement its policies.  
5.5 CIIs and information security standards  
Information security is governed by international standards such as ISO (ISO/IEC 
27000) that are adopted on a continuous basis by the relevant international bodies. Na-
tional information security policies or laws should comply with these standards. Institu-
tions that have adopted these standards generally require their trading partners to be cer-
tified as compliant. This is because information security is a pillar of essential services 
and economic development. Chia (2012) notes that that confidentiality of information 
refers to information protected from disclosure to unauthorised parties; integrity of in-
formation refers to protecting information from being modified by unauthorised parties; 
and availability refers to information that authorised parties are able to access when 
needed. These principles guide information security in order to assure end users that all 
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reasonable steps have been taken to ensure the confidentiality of information, to prevent 
it from being compromised or degraded, and ensure that it has retained the required lev-
el of accuracy, completeness and dependability.  
The following text refers to ISO standards that are vital for securing CIIs, and would 
promote public-private cooperation. The government could also use them as a basis for 
compliance with security requirements. 
5.5.1 Confidentiality, integrity and availability  
Availability seeks to ensure that the owner of the information has taken all the necessary 
steps to ensure that information is available to and accessible by those with the neces-
sary authorisation to access such information. These principles are very important as 
they provide end users with confidence and trust in the secure use of ICT. Policies, laws 
and regulations are intended to ensure that that the principles of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability are realised. Consistent with the above, the NCPF (2012) emphasises 
the need for government, the private sector and civil society to enjoy the full benefits of 
a safe and secure cyberspace. In order to achieve this objective, its stated purpose is to 
create a secure, dependable, reliable and trustworthy cyber environment that facilitates 
the protection of CIIs while strengthening the national security interests of the Republic.  
The NCPF also recognises that global interconnectivity plays a key role in respect of 
information infrastructures, and therefore promotes the adoption of international infor-
mation security standards. These standards will play a vital role in building the confi-
dence of South Africans in the secure use of ICT. Susanto (2011) concurs that infor-
mation is the life blood of organisations and a vital business asset in today’s infor-
mation-driven world. Therefore, securing information systems is vital. While globalisa-
tion and the interconnection of networks has improved access to essential services, it 
has also increased the exposure of organisation to cyber threats. International In order to 
mitigate these risks, standards have been developed to provide common international 
guidelines, objectives and controls. 
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When organisations adopt these information security standards and protocols, they build 
trust among their clients and other stakeholders that they are serious about securing their 
information systems. Hassouna, Bari and Mohammed (2015) agree that the adoption of 
cyber security standards help organisations to prepare for, respond to and recover from 
cyber-attacks. Governments can adopt these standards as a basis for managing infor-
mation security risks to CIIs, and evaluating service providers. As the biggest consumer 
of the essential services provided by the private sector, government can also use infor-
mation security standards as the minimum requirements for doing business with gov-
ernment. It will also allow the government to formulate clear compliance evaluation cri-
teria. Besides implementing the information security domains provided for in ISO 
27001, CII operators are also required to comply with all applicable policies, laws and 
regulations, particularly the NCPF.  
Compliance with international standards such as ISO 27001 enables companies to be 
certified as compliant, thus enhancing its ability to attract international business. The 
government is also expected to is adopt a flexible approach to the implementation of 
standards, thus giving companies some leeway in applying them in practice. These in-
formation security standards present the best opportunity for public-private cooperation 
in that it allows the government to focus on monitoring compliance with the adopted 
standards while also using compliance as an incentive for preferential government con-
tracts. This would give the private sector a reason to invest in the implementation of a 
comprehensive compliance framework.  
5.5.2 Compliance audit and risk management  
This standard seeks to provide guidelines for identifying, evaluating and mitigating in-
formation security risks before they affect service delivery (ISO/IEC 27005). It also re-
quires compliance with statutory, regulatory or contractual obligations as well as securi-
ty requirements. Risk assessments should be done continuously to determine areas of 
vulnerability and ensure appropriate remedial action. In order to be effective, infor-
mation security must be risk-oriented. CIIs need to implement baseline security controls 
and other measures identified through threat and risk assessments or needs analysis ex-
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ercises. The application of this standard takes into account policies, laws, and regula-
tions dealing with government-wide risk assessment processes. 
The repealed Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Act (No 68 of 2002) pro-
vided for periodic risk assessments of NCIIs, taking into account technological devel-
opments and the criticality of the NCII in terms of the severity levels referred to previ-
ously. The State Security Agency, as the government department responsible for secur-
ing CIIs, issued regulations prescribing periodic reviews of the risk status of NCIIs, as 
well as the risk assessment methodology. The South African approach to risk manage-
ment mainly focused on the security of CIIs within organs of state, and not those in the 
private sector. This reflected the absence of structured public-private cooperation. The 
repealed Act defined critical electronic communications’ as electronic communications 
held by organs of state which are necessary for the protection of the national security of 
the Republic’, and critical electronic communications infrastructure as ‘electronic com-
munications, products or systems used to transmit and store or transmit or store critical 
electronic communications’. 
As noted previously, not much was achieved in implementing these laws. As a result, 
South Africa remained exposed to a range of security threats. More recently, the gov-
ernment has introduced the Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Bill, which empowers the 
Minister, following recommendations by the Cyber Security Centre and after consulting 
proposed NCIIs, to declare information infrastructures as NCIIs of they are so strategic 
that any interference, or their loss, damage, disruption or immobilization, may prejudice 
the security, defence, law enforcement, health, economy, essential services or interna-
tional relations of the Republic. 
The Bill allows proposed NCIIs to object to such classification, after being informed of 
this by the Minister. Section 60 of the Bill requires the owner or manager of a NCII to 
organise a yearly audit, and inform the Director General of the State Security Agency of 
the intended audit. 
The Bill does not state whether the Minister should follow a sector or service approach 
to declaring NCIIs. The critical service approach as proposed by Mattioli and 
Bencheton (2014) looks at the criticality of the service to the social, economic and na-
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tional security of a country, which also informs the eventual declaration and security 
measures. The Bill does not express itself on the role of owners of CIIs in this process 
except that they would have an opportunity to oppose the intended declaration. The Bill 
does not indicate whether identification will follow a sector approach in terms of which 
the impact of each sector on the social, economic and national security of the Republic 
would be assessed and given the necessary categorisation. The Bill also does not refer to 
the certification of NCIIs as compliant with international information security standards. 
5.5.3 Information security governance  
Information security policy (ISO/IEC 27001: A.5) sets standards for governing infor-
mation security in a given organisation. It is used as a basis for conducting risk assess-
ments and audits of compliance with relevant laws, regulations and directives (Fenz, 
Heurix, Neubar & Pechstein, 2014). 
Some of the South African laws dealing with information security overlap, or do not 
provide clear guidelines for implementation. There is no coordination between the enti-
ties involved in administering these laws. 
These overlaps and contradictory mandates lead to the duplication of resources and ten-
sions between departments, resulting in information security rhetoric that is not backed 
up by coherent implementation. 
Information security policy is meant to take the NCPF into account, and to create vari-
ous structures with specific roles. The NCPF establishes the JCPS Cybersecurity Re-
sponse Committee, tasked with coordinating cybersecurity activities and at as a central 
point of contact on all cybersecurity matters pertinent to national security. This provi-
sion is also contained in the Cybersecurity and Cybercrimes Bill. The Bill provides for 
the establishment of a Cybersecurity Centre within the Department of State Security. 
The NCPF also mandates the Cybersecurity Centre to assume responsibility for protect-
ing NCIIs, including introducing public-private partnerships and action plans. 
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 Besides these structures, a Cybersecurity hub is meant to be established within the De-
partment of Telecommunications and Postal Services, serving as a forum of cooperation 
and engagement between the public and the private sector on matters relating to cyber-
security culture and awareness as well as local and international cooperation issues. 
Government and private sector CSIRTs are meant to be established to coordinate re-
sponses to identified cybersecurity incidents. The policy framework also calls for 
measures for identifying and categorising CIIs in critical sectors of the economy such as 
the maintenance of national law and order, the provision of public health or social ser-
vices, economic growth, or environmental matters. The determination of the sector im-
pact and the severity levels of impact will be informed by the categorisation and severi-
ty ratings of the CIIs. The severity ratings and impact analyses are based on maximum, 
moderate and minimum severity.  
The ISO standard on information security policy also requires executive management to 
develop an information security strategy setting out the vision and mission of the organ-
isation in respect of information security. The strategy document should also outline 
management’s commitment to information security. The strategy is also meant to ad-
dress internal and external factors that might have a negative impact on information se-
curity. 
As regards human resources security, the standard requires employees to be subjected to 
security screening before employment, depending on the level of access they will have 
to valuable and classified information. Not all employees or contractors should be 
granted access to CIIs. Employees with lower levels of security clearance are meant to 
have access to information equal to their security competency. 
Theoharidou (2010) notes that in terms of ISO 27005, risk assessments should be con-
ducted to determine the value of information, identify threats and vulnerabilities, and 
identify existing controls and their effects. In addition, risk assessments should prioritise 
the assessed, risks and rank them as a basis for mitigation. Government and CII owners 
need to develop a risk assessment process that outlines the scope of the risk assessment 
as well as the risk rating, or overall impact, taking into account the interdependences of 
the critical systems and the service. The risk assessment process needs to identify, ana-
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lyse and evaluate risks in relation to the criticality of the service provided by the rele-
vant CII. 
Contractors that may have access to CIIs should be subject to security clearance, and 
should not be given unlimited access to information. For information security to be ef-
fective, organisations need a smooth intersection between people, processes and tech-
nologies, and government and CII operators need to ensure that individuals who have 
access to classified information and assets are reliable and trustworthy, and loyal to the 
Republic. 
 
This standard also encompasses disciplinary procedures for violations, exit strategies to 
ensure an understanding of the need to preserve confidential information beyond em-
ployment, and restraint of trade. As regards asset management, this standard seeks to 
regulate the management of information security assets from an information security 
perspective, highlighting the importance of maintaining a comprehensive information 
assets inventory, assigning ownership, and outlining the acceptable use of these assets. 
CII operators are required to develop rules for information security inventories with an 
emphasis on information generated, transmitted, stored and destroyed/disposed. The in-
ventories should cover both physical security assets and ICT assets. The asset manage-
ment process should also deal with the destruction of information security assets such as 
shredded material and old ICT equipment.  
As regards access control, the standard seeks to integrate physical and logical access 
using new technologies such as smart cards and biometric technologies to ensure the 
easy monitoring of access to buildings and computer networks. The idea is that if an 
employee has not logged in at a perimeter access point, she/he should be denied access 
to the organisation’s computer network. Access control in all NCIIs should preserve the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. Control measures should be 
implemented and monitored in accordance with applicable ICT standards and proce-
dures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. 
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5.5.4 Physical and environmental security  
This standard seeks to prescribe baseline measures to address these disasters and the 
response approach and seeks to regulate the broad physical and environmental controls 
that need to be observed by al CIIs from perimeter fences in stand-alone buildings, entry 
controls into buildings and high security offices in order to prevent unauthorized access 
(ISO 27002). Environmental factors like fire, bombs, and floods need to be regulated. 
Standard operating procedures need to be prescribed and observed for cabling, and un-
interrupted supply of air-conditioning and power in certain areas. Security alertness 
needs to be a point of emphasis for every employee, especially in relation to strangers 
lingering in buildings.  
The standard also addresses regular threat assessments need to be conducted in order to 
monitor changes in the threat environment. On information security systems acquisition, 
development and maintenance, the information security policy needs to provide for pro-
vide guidance on continuous R&D process as an integral part of the security of the CIIs. 
Government has its own research capacities which can be used by both Government and 
NCII owners for further technology or systems development and also to consult on mat-
ters related to verification of industry-based soft wares.  
5.5.5 Security breaches and incident management  
The continuous monitoring of ICT security incidents and the planning of responses to 
such incidents is a vital protection mechanism of NCIIs. In this regard, the NCPF re-
quires the Cybersecurity Centre to develop processes and procedures for incident moni-
toring as well as a response plan in accordance with ISO 27035. It also requires the 
Minister to provide guidelines and procedures for detecting potential security breaches 
and the expected response to each incident type, aimed at ensuring that critical systems 
remain operational, as well as actions to be taken to recover and minimise exposure to a 
system compromise, and the role of Private Sector Security Incident Response Teams in 
supporting the CSC.  
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5.5.6 Business continuity and recovery plans  
This standard deals with backups, redundancy sites, and minimum security requirements 
(ISO 27031). The NCPF requires all CIIs to have business continuity and disaster re-
covery plans. They are also required to build data centres for the safe storage of sensi-
tive data. Not minimum requirements have been laid down. Some state entities have 
outsourced the security and storage of their data to the private sector. 
Cloud computing and data storage is growing trend which seems attractive to some in-
stitutions. However, there are no risk assessment procedures or regulations for manag-
ing offsite storage. The question to ask every institution is the following: If an aircraft 
crashes into your building, will you be able to function tomorrow? When your back-up 
information is managed by industry, what control do you have over that information? 
Some organisations have outsourced the hosting and management of critical databases. 
Do those private sector entities conform to the prescripts for securing, maintaining, and 
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6 CHAPTER 3- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Secondary and primary data have been gathered for this study. Secondary data, as re-
flected in the literature review, was gathered to illuminate international practice, espe-
cially in respect of public-private collaboration on cybersecurity, to provide a context 
for examining CII policy and legislation in South Africa. As regards the primary data, 
the researcher interviewed senior government policy and security advisers to gather 
their views on key aspects of South African policy, notably the issue of whether it pro-
motes collaboration between the state and the private sector in securing South Africa’s 
CIIs. Lastly, the researcher recorded the views of critical sector companies by studying 
their comments on government legislation, and conducting interviews with key execu-
tives. 
6.1 Conceptual framework  
CIIs play a central role in providing essential services in well-functioning and democrat-
ic states. Therefore, ensuring that the CIIs are protected and secured is a key element of 
social and economic stability and national security. Most CIIS are owned or operated by 
private sector entities. Therefore, securing CIIs requires effective public-private collab-
oration. 
Most countries in the developed world have successfully implemented models and 
standards for introducing public-private partnerships. While this is the stated intention 
of the South African government as well, this has not been translated into effective poli-
cy implementation. This study is aimed at examining the South African policy and leg-
islative process to establish how it intends to implement this model, assess progress 
made, identify the factors that are hampering this process, and suggest how they could 
be removed, thus opening the way to an effective cybersecurity regime involving all 
South African stakeholders.  
As noted previously, Brynard (2005) argues that the 5C protocol -- content, context, 
commitment, capacity and clients/coalitions -- are the pillars of successful policy im-
plementation. Inter alia, the South African policy process is assessed against these crite-
ria. 
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6.2 Research approach  
This is a qualitative study, and an instance of critical research. According to Neuman 
(2011), critical research is not only aimed at studying society, but also aims to change it. 
More specifically, critical social science researchers seek to transform social relations 
by exposing sources of social control, power relations and inequality. This perspective 
helped to inspire the researcher to conduct this research. 
While, until recently, issues of governance and national security were the exclusive pre-
serve of those in power, this situation has changed fundamentally. Today, the only route 
to sustainable development and national security is to share power with citizens, inter 
alia via structured cooperation between government, the private sector and civil society. 
Countries need to transform themselves by adopting democratic forms of governance 
marked by transparency, accountability, and respect for the rule of law. This study seeks 
to show that good governance and sustainable development can only achieved by means 
of cooperation between all national role players, and that this route should be adopted in 
South Africa as well. 
6.3 Research design 
The research focuses on document and process analysis and is divided into three sec-
tions. The first deals with governance matters such as existing policies, laws and regula-
tions. The second part focuses on the process for identifying and securing NCIIs, taking 
into account the importance of enterprise information security architecture. This analy-
sis is aligned with existing policies, regulations and laws. More specifically, it focuses 
on the extent to which the government is cooperating with the private sector in securing 
these CIIs. The secondary data shows that many developed economies have implement-
ed policies and strategies that promote structured public-private cooperation within and 
among nation states, while taking global interconnected technologies into account. Var-
ious models are assessed in order to find an appropriate model for South Africa, taking 
into account its unique challenges in this regard.  
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The research focuses on models of public-private cooperation in other jurisdictions. 
This data is then used as a basis for engaging with South African policy, legal and secu-
rity experts. Secondary data is analysed in order to develop a comparative analysis of 
South African policies and implementation strategies compared with those in selected 
jurisdictions. Senior government policy, legal and security experts were interviewed to 
gain their perspectives on the research questions and also to solicit their views on the 
best approach for South Africa. 
These officials were given an option not to disclose their identities or positions. They all 
indicated that they would prefer their identities to be disclosed as they were dealing with 
the issues covered in the report, and were engaging the private sector. In order to focus 
the interviews, questions were supplied to them in advance. The selected officials play 
key roles in the government policy process. They are: 
1. Advocate S. Robbertse, State Law Advisor on  Cybersecurity legislation and rele-
vant constitutional matters in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Devel-
opment,  
2. Mr Jabu Radebe, Chief Director, Cybersecurity and Critical Information Infra-
structure Policy in the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services,  
3. Mr V. Jaquire, Cybersecurity expert, and Manager of  National Information Securi-
ty Risk Management within the State Security Agency.  
As regards the private sector, the researcher selected key private sector entities that are 
likely to be identified as CIIs, namely Vodacom, Microsoft, the Internet Service Provid-
ers Association of South Africa, the Banking Association Of South Africa, R2k, and the 
Association of Fraud Examiners (SA). They were selected to provide a spectrum of ser-
vices falling within the broad category CIIs.  
6.4 Validity and reliability  
All the secondary data as accurately referenced, in accordance with the recommended 
referencing approach. Most of the secondary data was accessed by electronic means and 
referenced accordingly. 
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6.5 Research constraints  
The impact of technology and the interconnection of cyber networks on national securi-
ty is relatively new, particularly in respect of developing nations. As a result, the litera-
ture on this matter, dealing with challenges in the developing world in particular, is lim-
ited. Most scholars deal mainly with the strategies and approaches adopted by devel-
oped countries in Europe and the Americas, as well as some Asian countries. This lim-
ited focus does not provide a balanced picture. 
The research report focuses on the implementation of a public policy, and does not deal 
with sensitive or classified information. All the information referred to is publicly avail-
able, and the government officials interviewed were discouraged from referring to in-
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7 CHAPTER 4-DATA PRESENTATION 
7.1 Introduction 
The primary research focused on gathering information from senior policy, constitu-
tional and cybersecurity experts in the South African government. The interviews were 
conducted soon after the government had approved the NCPF. 
The officials selected for the interviews had all served on the government advisory team 
that helped to develop the NCPF. They were also members of the government’s Cyber 
Response Committee, which is responsible for developing and implementing cybersecu-
rity policies, strategies, technical capacity and structures and developing a skills base 
aimed at enabling South Africa to respond to the challenge of cyber threats. They were 
well placed to comment on government policy in respect of collaboration with the pri-
vate sector. The officials provided detailed replies to the questions submitted to them, 
thereby allowing the researcher to assess the government’s position on the matter under 
investigation. AT the time of the interviews, the officials were involved in developing 
overarching national legislation on combatting cyber threats and promoting cybersecuri-
ty in South Africa.  
7.2 Primary data: interviews of government officials 
7.2.1 Advocate Sarel Robbertse 
Advocate Sarel Robbertse is a Senior State Law Advisor in the Department of Justice 
and Correctional services. He is also a member of the JCPS Cyber Response Committee 
(CRC), an interdepartmental body established by the NCPF. He is responsible for coor-
dinating the drafting of the Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Bill, which seeks to combat 
cybercrime and provide for the identification and protection of CIIs. He agreed to be 
interviewed, but also asked to respond in writing to certain questions. I have therefore 
summarised their responses to the questions posed so as to give the context of their re-
sponses to this matter. 
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Question 1: Do we have policies, laws, regulations that promote public and private 
sector cooperation on the security of NCIIs?  
In relation to this question, Adv. Robbertse stated that, according to him,  Government 
policy on NCII protection seeks to prevent cyber-attacks against CIIs; reduce national 
vulnerabilities to cyber attacks; and minimise damage and recovery time when they do 
occur. He also stated that cooperation should include, amongst others, identifying prob-
lems and threats to NCII; alerting software and hardware vendors about security and the 
protection of their products; general awareness; research, fast and efficient reaction to 
all incidents related to the functioning of critical systems; international cooperation; and 
the creation of systems for formal and informal sharing of information about cyber 
threats.  
His view is that chapter IX of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 
2002 (Act No 25 of 2002) makes provision for the identification and protection of criti-
cal databases (but not systems). However, no real co-operation is built into that chapter. 
The state identifies critical databases, and prescribes procedures and standards for com-
pliance and enforcement. He also stated that the National Key Points Act (No 102 of 
1980) deals with physical infrastructure, including information infrastructures. Again, 
according to him, the state identifies Key Points, and prescribes procedures and stand-
ards for compliance and enforcement. So no real regulatory measures exist that facilitate 
co-operation between the public and private sector.  
In relation to existing regulations, he stated that various regulatory measures are in place 
in respect of financial institutions  but such regulations do not provide any space for 
public-private co-operation, and the same applies to our electronic communications reg-
ulatory measures, which prescribe to electronic communications providers what they 
must or must not do without allowing for public private sector co-operation. 
Hs view is that private-to-private or government-to-government agency co-operation is 
limited. The banking industry has a body which looks after cybersecurity in the indus-
try, as an example of private-to-private cooperation. He also stated that it is important to 
take into account that there are various laws on the statute book which limit infor-
mation-sharing between private entities.  
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These include the State Information Technology Agency Act, 1998 (Act 88 of 1998). In 
conclusion on this question, he stated that there is no real regulatory framework which 
would facilitate public-private participation relating to the protection of NCIIs. He fur-
ther submitted that, even, the concept of NCIIs is meagrely defined in section 53 of the 
ECTA as a ‘database’ which is ‘of importance for the protection of the national security 
of the Republic or the economic and social wellbeing of its citizens’.  And that the EC-
TA will not be applicable to the broader categories of structures which make up NCIIs.  
Question 2. What is the preferred model for achieving an appropriate balance be-
tween secrecy, transparency and accountability in respect of the security of critical 
systems?  
Adv Robbertse advised that models of cooperation differ from one country to the other 
depending on the unique socio-economic realities and national security approach of 
such a Country. He made the reference to the ENISA survey which shows the various 
models adopted by countries within the Council of Europe that South Africa could learn 
from. 
Question 3. What is the preferred model for the identification of NCII -- a sector 
approach, a government-private sector approach, a cross-sector approach, or a 
critical institutions approach?  
In relation to a preferred approach or criteria for the identification of CIIs, he stated that 
identifying CIIs depends on the results of national risk assessments, the impact any dis-
ruption would have on a country. These assessments may be affected by different fac-
tors at different times. He further indicated that he agrees with the approach of the Eu-
ropean Union Agency for Network and Information Security to identifying CIIs. His 
view is also that a sector approach without the involvement of government would mean 
that the object and scope of protection is determined in most instances by a specific sec-
tor, which may not take the needs of another sector into account and that a Government-
private sector approach is to be preferred, as this approach was also adopted by the US 
and the EU. In conclusion on this matter, he submitted that he does not think that South 
African government has the necessary capacity or resources to deal with this aspect and 
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this was demonstrated by the failure to implement the provisions of chapter IX of the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act.  
Question 4. Do you believe that the relevant ISO standards can assist in the promo-
tion of greater cooperation between the government and the private sector in se-
curing NCIIs, and to what extent?  
His view is that it would be preferable for Government to implement the ISO standards 
as the basis for improved cooperation between Government and the private sector but he 
states that the implementation of these standards usually has cost implications for ser-
vice providers. CIIs which are serious about cybersecurity will prefer a standard of 
compliance, and the ISO may serve this purpose, since it may act as a shield against civ-
il liability. 
7.2.2 Mr V Jaquire 
Mr Jaquire is a manager in the State Security Agency responsible for National Infor-
mation security Risk Assessment and Management Services. His role includes leading a 
team that is responsible for conducting risk assessments within organs of state in order 
to determine their level of security and vulnerability against unauthorised access. He 
advises that, before the repeal of the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Act, 
risk assessments were conducted every two years. He stated that while his confirmed 
area of responsibility includes identifying CIIs within the organs of state not much has 
been achieved in this regard due to a lack of policy clarity or a framework for coopera-
tion between government and the private sector. In relation to the questions posed, he 
provided the following summarised responses. 
Question 1: Do we have policies, laws, regulations that promote public--private co-
operation on NCIIs?  
His view is that due to the fact that both government and the private sector are affected 
should NCIIs be compromised, the securing of NCII needs to be addressed by both the 
public and private sectors, in line with an appropriate implementation strategy, timelines 
and public private partnership strategy. He further stated that he is not aware of laws or 
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regulations that specifically address public private cooperation on NCII (except for 
some provisions in the POPI Act), some frameworks (such as the NCPF) do touch on 
the issue. He went on to state that there is a need for guidelines with regard to public-
private partnerships, specifically to ensure that the most effective resources within the 
country are engaged to ensure the effective securing of the country’s NCIIs.  
Question 2: What is the preferred model for achieving an appropriate balance be-
tween secrecy, transparency and accountability in respect of the security of critical 
systems?  
With regard to the security of critical systems, he stated that he preferred more confi-
dentiality. He argued that the less cyber criminals know about the systems and processes 
that are utilised to secure critical infrastructure, the more difficult it would be for them 
to select the most appropriate attack methods and vectors. That the preferred model 
would ideally be for strategic partnerships to be created between government and the 
private sector, both for the sharing of skills as well as the development and/or supply of 
technologies: specifically for securing NCII and critical systems and that this should 
happen within the framework of approved government procurement regulation and pro-
cesses that can be audited by independent (security cleared) auditors. This will allow for 
appropriate transparency, while still ensuring the confidentiality of the security 
measures that are implemented.  
Question 3: What is the preferred model for identifying NCIIs – a sector approach, 
a government-private sector approach, a cross-sector approach, or a critical insti-
tutions approach?  
His view is that the security of NCIIs is the responsibility of both government and the 
private sector but it is widely understood and accepted that most of the NCIIs lie within 
the private sector. He suggested a sector approach, driven and coordinated by govern-
ment, in consultation and with the assistance of the private sector.  
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Question 4: Do you believe that the relevant ISO standards can assist in the pro-
motion of greater cooperation between government and the private sector in secur-
ing NCIIs, and to what extent?  
He stated that ISO  standards provide a worldwide set of standards that could form a 
best practice basis on which the government and the private sector could base its coop-
eration, without conflicting agendas influencing the desired outcome, namely securing 
NCIIs for the benefit of the country and its people.  
7.2.3 Mr J. Radebe 
Mr Radebe is a Chief Director in the Department of Telecommunications and Postal 
Services, and is responsible for cybersecurity and CII policy. He advised that he had 
been involved in the development of the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act of 2002. He also advised that the Department of Telecommunications and Postal 
Services was responsible for implementing the ECT Act, specifically the provisions re-
lating to the identification and protection of critical databases. He is also a member of 
the JCPS cluster CRC which is responsible for implementing the NCPF in the Republic.  
Question 1: Do we have policies, laws, regulations that promote public--private 
sector cooperation on NCIIs?  
He stated that the NCPF requires the development of a National Critical Information 
Infrastructure Policy for South Africa which will enable through regulatory means the 
adoption of appropriate mechanisms to identify and protect CIIs, develop minimum se-
curity standards, and facilitate effective public-private partnerships for protecting NCI-
Is. He accepts that a significant portion of CIIs are privately owned or operated and as a 
result a result, is a need for cooperation with the private sector in this regard? 
Hr admitted that, prior to the adoption by Cabinet of the NCPF, there was less interac-
tion with the private sector on this issue. The Department of Telecommunications and 
Postal Services has continuously engaged with the private sector on a range of policy 
matters since the 1994 transition to democracy. 
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Question 2: What is the preferred model for achieving an appropriate balance be-
tween secrecy, transparency and accountability in respect of the security of critical 
systems?  
 He stated that NCIIs are exposed to various vulnerabilities which have an impact on the 
efficiency of the provision of services as they are responsible for providing a range of 
critical services to the general public. In this regard, he proposed that products and sys-
tems used to secure NCIIs should be assessed and certified by outside certification 
companies to ensure that they are secure. That there is a need for an appropriate balance 
between secrecy, transparency and accountability and such may be achieved by differ-
ent categorisation and security classification of NCIIs, coupled with access control in-
formed by the security classifications in question.  
Question 3: What is the preferred model for identifying and securing NCIIs?  
He submits that there is a need for clear regulatory measures that will guide the identifi-
cation of NCIIs. Such regulatory measures should set out criteria for identifying NCIIs, 
including the process of declaring NCIIs by the Minister. He further submitted that oth-
er jurisdictions use a sector-based approach in which a dedicated sector NCII identifica-
tion team is appointed and assists the Minister in identifying the sector’s NCIIs and nec-
essary risk classification for protection purposes including identifying sector and cross 
sector inter-dependencies as well as proposing measures for the protection of NCIIs 
within that sector. In addition, he proposed that the Minister of State Security may im-
pose conditions of compliance on the owners of declared NCIIs.  
Question 4: Do you believe that the relevant ISO standards can help to promote 
greater cooperation between government and the private sector in securing NCIIs, 
and to what extent?  
He advised that regulatory measures should recommend the adoption of the ISO stand-
ards on information security, which sets out criteria which must be taken into account to 
secure NCIIs. He also proposed that the CRC should make recommendations to the 
Minister regarding the adoption of information security standards, including relevant 
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information structures which needed in the process of the auditing of compliance of the 
declared National Critical Information Infrastructures to the adopted standards.  
7.3 Private sector perspectives  
The views of various key relevant private sector entities and civil society organisations 
were researched and recorded. This was done by studying their comments on the draft 
Cybersecurity and Cybercrimes Bill in 2015, and by interviewing relevant executives. 
The interviews were guided by the research questions. The executive were asked to 
share their views on the issues raised by the research questions.  Some of the interview-
ees also submitted responses in writing. 
Most of the private sector experts indicated that their opinions about the government’s 
approach to the identification and protection of the CIIS were guided by their compa-
nies’ responses to the Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Bill. These submissions were im-
portant as they conveyed the views of those companies on the role of public-private co-
operation in securing CIIs. The results of this research is presented below. 
7.3.1 The Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA)  
ISPA agreed with the proposal for the security of the NCIIs as contained in the pro-
posed law in view of the fact that the size and scope of some of the larger private elec-
tronic communications networks and service providers in South Africa and the fact that 
it is  quite conceivable that sabotage of those providers would:  
a) prejudice the security, the defence, law enforcement or international relations of 
the Republic;  
b) prejudice the health or safety of the public;  
c) cause interference with or disruption of, an essential service;  
d) cause any major economic loss;  
e) cause destabilization of the economy of the Republic; or  
f) create a public emergency situation.  
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In this regard, ISPA submitted that, given the extent of requirements and obligations 
relevant to NCII in the Draft Cybersecurity Bill, it would be of extreme concern to its 
membership if the criteria for declaration and the related process was not clarified and 
simplified to make it easy for compliance by their members. ISPA furthermore advised 
that Government should avoid adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in dealing with 
this matter. My view of the submission from ISPA is that they do not envisage a part-
nership arrangement with Government on this matter but see themselves having to com-
ply with Government policy requirements. This approach from ISPA is consistent with 
the policy implementation process that has been followed by Government in South Af-
rica. As indicated above, it is clear that this approach has not worked in the implementa-
tion of this current policy. 
Source: ISPA public submission on Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill, 2015. Depart-
ment of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
7.3.2 Vodacom  
Vodacom submitted that the draft Bill should prescribe guidelines to be followed by the 
Cyber Security Centre and the Cyber Response Team before recommending infrastruc-
ture as National Critical Information Infrastructure in terms of Section 58 (1). That these 
guidelines should consist of a number of elements, which include inter alia the identifi-
cation and classification of threats, the identification of the vulnerability of each infra-
structure, and the identification of counter measures to be considered prior to declara-
tion of infrastructure as critical. 
Further, Vodacom proposes that the DoJ and CD should clarify whether certain ECSPs 
will be exempted from the definition of National Critical Information Infrastructure. If 
this is the case, the Bill should prescribe beforehand the criteria that will be followed in 
exempting the ECSPs as such exemptions are likely to place the exempted operators at 
an advantage compared to Critical Information ECSPs. 
Source: Vodacom public submission on Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill, 2015. De-
partment of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
Government and private sector cooperation on security of Critical information Infrastruc-
tures 
 
Page 62 of 80 
 
4.3.3  The Banking Association of South Africa  
The view of the Banking association in this regard is that the inclusion of the private 
sector within the overly broad definition of state-managed/controlled ‘National Critical 
Information Infrastructure’ process is cause for concern, as this would result in signifi-
cant regulatory, bureaucratic and security overlap, control and potential systemic risk to 
the private sector, let alone significant and potentially unwarranted compliance costs.  
The submission therefore recommended that the private sector be removed from this 
section. 
They further submitted that Financial Sector Regulation Bill contained sufficient provi-
sions which would enable the private sector to secure their critical systems against natu-
ral or man-made disasters and they further rejected any attempt by Government to im-
pose conditions on security of their own systems. They proposed that the NCIIs referred 
to in the Bill should be ones owned by government and not private sector infrastructure. 
It was stared that the imposition of such externally imposed audit costs on, and the re-
porting by, the private sector is rejected as an unwarranted bureaucratic imposition, and 
should be amended to apply to government infrastructures only. 
Source: Public submission by the Banking Council of South Africa on the Cybercrime 
and Cybersecurity Bill, 2015. Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
7.3.3 The Right To Know Campaign (R2K) 
 The R2K submitted that it believes that a free and open internet is crucial to the full re-
alisation of our constitutionally enshrined right to freedom of expression, which in-
cludes, but is not limited to, the freedom to impart or receive information or ideas, free-
dom of the press, freedom of artistic creativity, academic freedom, and freedom of sci-
entific research. That the internet has the potential to democratise knowledge in unprec-
edented ways. It was noted by R2K with concern Government attempts, through the 
Cybersecurity Bill, to introduce widespread state and corporate surveillance, new cen-
sorship mechanisms to regulate online content, often under the guise of security or 
‘moral’ reasons. In this regard, R2K in its submission advised the general public to re-
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main vigilant in defending internet rights and push back against reactionary legislation 
and policies that enable greater state and corporate control of the internet and also to 
reject the draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (‘the Cybercrimes Bill’) in its en-
tirety. The need to combat genuine cybercrime is not contested. However, the Bill con-
tains deep and fundamental flaws that threaten the fundamental democratic spirit of the 
internet.  
According to R2K, the  Bill creates a regime that is so broad and overarching that al-
most all possible crimes that could exist on the internet are dealt with using the same set 
of tools – from the risk of terrorist cyberattacks to the imagined crimes of an ordinary 
Facebook or BBM user. That the Bill hands wide-ranging powers to state-security struc-
tures to secure vast parts of the internet as assets of state-security, rather than common 
spaces for the good of all and that the Bill establishes State Security structures to moni-
tor internet and that such structures lack the necessary transparency, accountability, 
mandate and organisational culture. R2K further submitted that National Critical Infor-
mation Infrastructures should be confined to government owned infrastructures and 
therefore the authoritarian and dictatorial approach reflected in the draft Bill, which is 
the inclusion of the privately owned, infrastructures is simply not constitutionally ac-
ceptable. As indicated above, this submission is also another clear example of a lack of 
trust and cooperation between Government and private sector. This trust deficit indi-
cates the failure of government to implement the 5C protocols in policy development 
and implementation. 
Source: Public submission of the Right to Know Campaign on the draft Cybercrimes 
and Cybersecurity Bill, 2015. Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
7.3.4 The Association of Fraud Examiners (AFE SA Chapter)  
The AFE submitted that the section on the identification and the protection of the CIIs is 
the most concerning of all, especially as it relates to government intervention in the op-
erating of a private or public company. That if a piece of infrastructure within this com-
pany is considered to be a National Critical Information Infrastructure, then the Cyber 
Response Committee directly takes control of the rules and regulations governing the 
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Policies, classification of Data, Access, Archiving, Security measures, Disaster recovery 
and the time allowed for the owning entity to comply with these regulations. If the own-
er fails to comply, the Cabinet may make those changes, and recover the costs. Once an 
infrastructure has been declared a National Critical Information infrastructure, it may 
not even be audited by anyone without approval of the Director General. 
The submission suggest that no Private Sector Infrastructures should be able to be de-
clared National Critical Information Infrastructures as this is tantamount to Nationaliza-
tion of these infrastructures.  
Source: Public submission of the Association of Fraud Examiners (SA Chapter) on the 
draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, 2015. Department of Justice and Constitu-
tional Development.  
7.3.5 Microsoft South Africa 
Microsoft South Africa submitted that the Draft Bill already goes some way towards 
implementing this risk-focused and that the notion that minimum physical and technical 
security measures be implemented is endorsed in order to protect NCIIs. That achieving 
a security baseline will significantly reduce the risk to NCIIs including the adoption of 
well-known security approaches to help manage risk, such as the ISO/IEC 27000 related 
standards. Microsoft further recommended the use of international standards–based 
frameworks where possible and that Government should consider to give providers flex-
ibility to decide how best to fully comply with security requirements. Strict mandates 
will not stand the test of time and are likely to chill investment in innovative new securi-
ty measures, turning cybersecurity into an administrative box-ticking exercise. The 
submission also proposed that Government bring together stakeholders to standardize 
what constitutes acceptable security requirements and the sequence of events required 
by the assessor, delineating the range of deviation allowable from the baseline require-
ment’s recommendations. That this approach is important when the criteria are set for 
the first time, however, it is also critical that the criteria be revisited regularly to incor-
porate any new technological solutions. It is noted that this is the only submission that 
appears to support Government intention to identify and secure NCIIs. It is important to 
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also note that the submission is silent on the public private sector cooperation but it calls 
for the discussions by stakeholders of a criteria for compliance. As indicated above, this 
points to a failure of government to promote the public-private cooperation on this mat-
ter. 
Source: Public submission of Microsoft on the draft Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity 
Bill, 2015. Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
8 CHAPTER 5-DATA ANALYSIS  
The data has been ordered and analysed in order to develop responses to the research 
questions. Focus areas include:  
• Public policy or laws that are creating a conducive framework for public-private co-
operation in respect to CIIP.  
• Level of cooperation, if any, in the implementation of these policies or laws. 
• An assessment of the extent to which the 5-C protocol has been taken into account 
in formulating government cybersecurity policy, or would have been helpful. 
8.1 International practice 
The research shows that private sector and civil society pressure for the democratisation 
of nation states and governments has played a central role in the transformation of gov-
ernance in a number of world regions, and that this has led to more democratic, trans-
parent and accountable systems of policy development and implementation involving all 
stakeholders, including private sector stakeholders.  
The research also shows that many countries – particularly those in the developed world 
-- have adopted policies and strategies which promote structured public-private coopera-
tion, particularly in areas affected by global technological changes such as identifying 
and securing CIIs (Assaf, 2008). Experts agree that many essential services involve 
computer networks, that many of those systems are owned and operated by the private 
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sector, and that many of them are not secured against cyber-attack (Kyoung-Sik Min, 
2015).  
According to Muhaya (2010), CIIs are regularly penetrated by hackers and hostile 
agents. He argues that this calls for a partnership between government and the private 
sector so as to detect the attacks and prevent unauthorised access and theft of data. This 
view is supported by various experts in this field, including Suter (2007).  
As noted earlier, the current approaches of European countries to identifying and pro-
tecting CIIs have been recorded in a survey, reflected in the ENISA report on method-
ologies for identifying CIIS published in 2014. It shows that most European countries 
have opted for structured public-private partnerships as opposed to a compliance ap-
proach imposed by the state. The research shows that the partnership approach has been 
effective in promoting cooperation between government and the private sector, based on 
trust and a joint commitment to achieving mutual objectives. By contrast, in the compli-
ance approach, government assumes as ‘big brother’ role that alienates potential social 
partners. In this framework, the recommendation the ENISA report to member states 
and operators of CIIs are as follows:  
• Member states should clearly identify CIIs, using one method or a mix of methods 
that best fit their needs. 
• In doing so, member states should cooperate with all stakeholders involved in oper-
ating critical information infrastructures. 
• Member states who base their identification of CIIs on critical services should de-
velop a list of these services, and assess their internal and external interdependen-
cies. This should include interdependencies within a critical sector (intra-sector); in-
terdependencies between critical sectors (cross-sector); and interdependencies 
among data network assets. 
• Following this, member states should foster baseline security measures. 
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Against this background, the report shows that most European countries have adopted 
national cyber security strategies and legislation aimed at fostering structured collabora-
tion between the public and private sectors. These include: 
• joint governance structures of institutions and instruments dealing with CIIs, includ-
ing national cybersecurity centres, national computer security incident response 
teams CSIRTs), data protection inspectorates, and cyber cops responsible for pre-
venting cyber incidents;  
• Strategic plans for all economic sectors as well as cyber incident management plans 
drawn up by and involving all stakeholders. These include periodic risk assess-
ments, operational plans for critical services, and protocols for reporting security in-
cidents.  
8.2 The South African policy and legal framework 
The research shows that South African cybersecurity strategies are largely confined to 
government policies and laws without the involvement of the private sector.  
8.2.1 Current legislation 
The National Key Points Act (1980) empowers the Minister of Police to declare any 
place or area which he/she believes is so important that its loss, damage, disruption or 
immobilization may prejudice the Republic, or whenever he considers it necessary or 
expedient for the safety of the Republic or in the public interest, as a National Key 
Point. The Act requires the Minister to advise owners of these places or areas of their 
declaration of National Key Points, upon which they are required to secure them. 
This law was made in the apartheid era to secure physical infrastructure, particularly 
those owned by the state or state entities. As a result, it has not featured prominently in 
the current debates on identifying and securing CIIs, and is due to be repealed by the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Bill. 
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The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (2002) provides for certain 
classes of information that are important to the protection of the national security of the 
Republic or the economic and social well-being of its citizens to be declared as critical 
data, and the identification of  critical databases. It empowers the Minister of Commu-
nications to prescribe procedures, requirements and standards for registering and man-
aging critical databases. 
This Act was passed in 2002 soon after the South African government had signed the 
Budapest Convention, and represented South Africa’s first attempt to implement the 
Convention. While it criminalised cybercrime, and provided for the identification and 
protection of critical databases, it did not provide any implementation mechanisms. As a 
result, the South African Police Service has not been able to implement the provisions 
on cybercrime contained in the Act. No regulations have been developed to determine 
the ‘classes of information’ referred to in the Act, or identifying and securing critical 
databases, despite the fact this is required by the Act. Some of its provisions are meant 
to be repealed by the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill.  
8.2.2 New policy framework and proposed legislation  
Following the rapid escalation of cybercrime from the late 1990s onwards, the govern-
ment went back to the drawing board and developed a National Cybersecurity Policy 
Framework (NCPF). Approved by Cabinet in 2012, and gazetted in 2015, it seeks to 
foster the development and implementation of a ‘government-led, coherent and inte-
grated’ approach to cybersecurity. 
Key objectives include centralising the coordination of cybersecurity activities, but also 
fostering cooperation and coordination between government, the private sector and civil 
society.  
The policy framework would be overseen by the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security 
Cluster (JCPS), working in consultation with other government clusters, with the aim of 
ensuring the centralised coordination of cybersecurity issues. 
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A dedicated committee, the JCPS Cybersecurity Response Committee, would be estab-
lished within the CPS Cluster to coordinate cybersecurity activities and drive the im-
plementation of the NCPF. The committee would be chaired by the State Security 
Agency (SSA) and supported operationally by a Cybersecurity Centre situated in the 
SSA. All relevant JCPS departments would be represented on the committee. 
Inter alia, it would oversee and guide the functioning of the Cybersecurity Centre, the 
Cybersecurity Hub, the government’s Computer Security Incidence Response team 
(ECT-CSIRT), and any other CSIRTs in the country. 
Coordination and consultation between the JCPS cluster departments, the private sector 
and civil society would be promoted by a Cybersecurity Hub to be established within 
the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services (DOC). 
Among other things, the hub would develop public-private partnerships; collaborate 
with other sector SSIRTs; provide best practice guidance to government, business and 
civil society; initiate cybersecurity awareness campaigns; promote compliance with 
standards, procedures and policy development by the CRC; and encourage and facilitate 
the development of additional sector SSIRTs  
Following approval of the NCPF, the government began to develop the Cybercrimes 
and Cybersecurity Bill (2015). While tabled in Parliament, it has not been passed or 
promulgated. It is generally consistent with the Budapest Convention and the NCPF. 
It empowers the Minister of State Security, upon receipt of a recommendation by the 
Cyber Response Committee and after consulting the owner of the CII in question, to 
declare an information infrastructure as a CII. It also empowers the Minister to prescribe 
minimum standards for classification, storage and disaster recovery. Owners are re-
quired to audit declare CIIs every 24 months, at their own cost. The Bill also empowers 
the Director-General of the SSA to order an audit of a CII. The Bill does not promote 
structured cooperation between the government and the private sector. Instead, it re-
quires owners of information infrastructures and networks to comply with mandatory 
provisions relating to the identification and security of CIIs. 
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International experiences as shown that this approach is unlikely to produce positive 
results. Given the government’s lack of capacity, it will also struggle to ensure compli-
ance. A more collaborative approach is likely to produce better results, as this would 
create a win-win situation for both the government and the private sector. 
Advocate Robbertse confirmed that there was no current legislation or regulations that 
facilitated public-private cooperation in identifying and protecting NCIIs. 
Mr Jacquire also stated that, while the NCPF supported the principle of public-private 
cooperation on NCIIs, he was not aware of any laws or regulations (except for some 
provisions in the POPI Act) that applied this in practice. This principle should be ap-
plied more widely to ensure that national resources for identifying and securing NCIIs 
were used as effectively as possible. The preferred model would be to introduce strate-
gic partnerships between the government and the private sector for sharing skills as well 
as developing and / or supplying technologies for securing NCIIs. 
Mr Radebe concurred that the current regulatory framework did not incorporate public-
private cooperation, but that the NCPF sought to provide for via in a different way. Giv-
en that a significant portion of CIIs were privately owned or operated, there was a need 
for cooperation with the private sector in this regard. Prior to the adoption by Cabinet of 
the NCPF, there was less interaction with the private sector on this issue. The views of 
senior government policy managers and major private sector entities differed on what 
form this should take, and how this should be achieved. 
The submissions by key private sector entities which are likely to meet the criteria for 
the declaration as CIIs also reflect different and even opposing views.  
Vodacom proposes that the government should prescribe guidelines to be followed by 
the Cyber Security Centre and Cyber Response Team before recommending infrastruc-
ture as CIIs. This approach seems to preferring compliance with laid down rules rather 
some form of partnership. As argued above, this approach has not succeeded in South 
Africa, partly due to the government’s endemic lack of capacity to enforce laws and 
regulations. 
Government and private sector cooperation on security of Critical information Infrastruc-
tures 
 
Page 71 of 80 
The Banking Council of SA argues that inclusion of the private sector within the over-
ly broad definition of state-managed/controlled CIIs is cause for concern, ‘as this would 
result in significant regulatory, bureaucratic and security overlap, control and potential 
systemic risk to the private sector, let alone significant and potentially unwarranted 
compliance costs. It is therefore recommended that the private sector, per se, be re-
moved from this section’.  
R2K submits that legal provisions on CIIs contained in the draft legislation must be 
confined to government-owned infrastructure, and that the ‘authoritarian and dictatorial 
approach reflected in the legislation is simply not constitutionally acceptable’. 
According to Microsoft, ‘the most effective way to improve cybersecurity is to give 
providers flexibility to decide how best to fully comply with security requirements. 
Strict mandates will not stand the test of time and are likely to chill investment in inno-
vative new security measures, turning cybersecurity into an administrative box-ticking 
exercise. To allow for this the government should also bring together stakeholders to 
standardize what constitutes acceptable security requirements and the sequence of 
events required by the assessor, delineating the range of deviation allowable from the 
baseline requirement’s recommendations.’  
The Association of Fraud Examiners believes that no private sector infrastructures 
should declared as NCIIs, as this would amount to their nationalisation.  
Therefore, it is clear that while the NCPF supports the principle of public-private coop-
eration as a mechanisms for identifying and securing CIIs, current legislation and draft 
legislation does not put this principle into practice. Moreover, the South African private 
sector appears to view any proposed cooperation with government as an unnecessary 
interference in its private affairs which, in its view, contravenes the South  
African Constitution. 
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9 CHAPTER 6- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Experts agree that the need to secure CIIs present nation states with major new policy 
challenges. They also agree that structured public-private cooperation is one of the most 
effective ways of addressing those challenges, both nationally and internationally. Some 
areas of cooperation are outlined below. 
9.1 International cooperation  
Given the borderless and transnational nature of cybercrime, national states cannot fo-
cus only on securing their own CIIs. Instead, they need to collaborate with other coun-
tries, notably their trading partners. 
The Council of Europe and European Union have taken important steps to promote in-
ternational collaboration on this issue. This includes the Budapest Convention, which is 
managed by the Council of Europe but is open to signature by countries worldwide. 
The Convention seeks to assist its signatories to develop legal and technical systems for 
dealing with cybersecurity within their national boundaries on the one hand, and coop-
erate with other member states on cybersecurity and cybercrime on the other. Among 
other things, the Council of Europe, with funding from the European Union, has em-
barked on a global initiative aimed at ensuring that member states have the necessary 
technical capacity to implement the Budapest Convention. 
While the UN has undertaken some initiatives on cybersecurity through the UNDOC, it 
has not achieved much except for a global study that was finalised in 2013, and the Bu-
dapest Convention remains the only international instrument for promoting cybersecuri-
ty that is currently being implemented on a global scale. It has been argued that the UN 
should adopt another global convention on cybercrime on the grounds that the Budapest 
Convention is essentially a European convention. The Council of Europe disputes this 
view on the grounds that the Convention is not confined to European member states, has 
signatories on all continents, and therefore qualifies to be regarded as the required glob-
al instrument. While the AU has adopted its own convention on cybersecurity, it does 
not incorporate a detailed implementation process like that in the Budapest Convention.  
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9.1.1 National policies, laws and structures for dealing with cybersecurity 
ENISA reports and other sources provide a rich source of information on how other ju-
risdictions have deal with cybersecurity. While South Africa should not necessarily 
adopt the same approach – and ENISA itself emphasises that countries should adapt 
their responses to their specific needs – the best practice models in Europe and else-
where are instructive. Most European counties have adopted initiatives to deal with the 
issue of cybersecurity and identifying and securing CIIs. 
 
 Most of these countries have adopted national cybersecurity policies and strategies as 
well as legislation emanating from those policies, including laws dealing with emergen-
cies as well as data recovery. These policies and legislation contain explicit provisions 
for identifying CIIs. All the countries sampled have developed methods for identifying 
critical sectors and subsectors as well as services that are vital to their socio-economic 
and national security. Most of these critical services and sectors are listed in their na-
tional cybersecurity strategies. 
The policies and strategies of most European countries incorporate structured coopera-
tion between their governments and private sectors, and the roles and responsibilities of 
public and private sector entities are clearly set out in relevant laws and regulations. 
There are relations of mutual trust between governments and the owners / operators of 
critical infrastructure.  Most countries have national plans for protecting critical infra-
structure that cover both the public and private sectors, and encompass all sectors of the 
economy. There are clear frameworks for cooperation between government and its 
agencies, such as ministries responsible for security; national cybersecurity centres; the 
owners or operators of CIIs; government and private sector CSIRTs; academia; and re-
search and development institutions.  
By contrast, there is a lack of clarity about South Africa’s international cooperation on 
cybercrime and cybersecurity. South Africa signed the Budapest Convention in 2001, 
but has not yet ratified it despite the fact that it has participated in and benefited from 
the Council of Europe’s GLACY project. South Africa has also signed the [SADC 
Government and private sector cooperation on security of Critical information Infrastruc-
tures 
 
Page 74 of 80 
Model Law on Cybersecurity. There is also no clarity about how South Africa intends to 
deal with the African Convention in the context of its participation in the Budapest 
Convention. 
 
South Africa is also part of the BRICS grouping, which is known to be pushing for a 
UN Convention on Cybercrime and Cybersecurity. None of the other BRICS members 
are signatories to the Budapest Convention. This lack of clarity is likely to affect South 
Africa’s international standing. Its unclear policy position and its simultaneous in-
volvement in and support for different multilateral groupings and instruments may de-
tract from levels of trust between South Africa and its African, European and CRICS 
partners. 
At the national level, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA) of 
2002 provided for the declaration of certain classes of information which are of im-
portance to the protection of the national security of the Republic or the economic and 
social well-being of its citizens as critical data, and for identifying critical databases It 
also empowered the Minister to prescribe procedures, requirements and minimum 
standards for the registration and management of critical databases. None of these pro-
visions have been implemented, and no regulations have been adopted to clarify the 
procedures for identifying and securing CIIs, or clarifying the roles of the owners of CI-
Is which are, in the main, private sector entities.  
Instead of implementing ECTA, the South African government has adopted the NCPF 
which recognises that a significant proportion of South Africa critical infrastructures are 
owned or operated by the private sector, and expresses support for the principle of pub-
lic-private cooperation in identifying and securing CIIs. However, no significant pro-
gress has been made in implementing the NCPF. The private sector players who are 
likely to be declared CIIs are opposed to the government being involved in declaring 
their systems as CIIs, which they regard as a contravention of the constitutional right to 
privacy. While the Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill was first tabled in parliament in 
2015, it has been redrafted several times, and it is still unclear when it will pass into 
law. 
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Global information security is governed by a set of international standards adopted and 
amended by international bodies such as ISO (ISO/IEC 27000). Institutions that have 
adopted these standards generally require their trading partners to comply with these 
standards. The extent to which South African institutions involved in cybersecurity have 
adopted these standards, or intend to comply with them, is uncertain. 
This report has argued that policy implementation should be well structured, and that 
the 5C protocol provides a useful model for structuring public policies such as policy on 
cybersecurity. It has also argued the South African should consistently adopt a model of 
public-private cooperation for managing cybersecurity, including the identification and 
securing of CIIs. 
 
It has done so on the grounds that public-private cooperation is a form of participatory 
democracy in which those who are governed play a significant role in holding govern-
ment accountable and improving access to information, but also bring their own skills 
and capacity to bear on public policy and its implementation. Noting that public-private 
cooperation in South Africa is complicated by the different and often divergent political 
interests of the various parties and stakeholders, the report has found that the govern-
ment has been unable to implement legislation on cybersecurity passed in 2002 and that 
implementation of the more recent national cybersecurity policy framework appears to 
be faltering, largely due to the government’s capacity challenges as well as its majoritar-
ian approach to policy implementation.  
9.2 RECOMMENDATIONS  
Given the findings of this study, the author recommends that the South African govern-
ment should consider the following public policy choices in respect of cybersecurity: 
• Policy-makers need to clarify South Africa’s position in relation to the Budapest 
Convention – specifically whether South Africa is prepared to ratify the Convention. 
• Similarly, policy-makers need to clarify South Africa’s position in respect of the 
African Union Convention on Cybersecurity. The Council of Europe is increasingly 
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focusing on assisting African countries to sign and observe the Budapest Conven-
tion. A growing number of African states are participating in the Budapest Conven-
tion process, some as observers, while others are in the process of ratifying the con-
vention (TCY 2016). 
• Similarly, policy-makers should decide on South Africa’s stance on UN efforts to 
develop another international convention on cybercrime. In the course of doing so, 
they should compare the advantages of developing a new international convention 
with those of broadening the scope of the existing instruments to take account of is-
sues being raised by non-members.  
• Studies show that a lack of skills and capacity for technological development are the 
biggest impediments to the implementation of cybersecurity strategies in the devel-
oping world, and this deficit is making itself felt in South Africa as well. IT is close-
ly linked to deficiencies in the South African education system and its relative ina-
bility to develop scarce skills. Notable initiatives in this area are being undertaken 
by the institutions such as the University of the Witwatersrand and the University of 
Johannesburg. The government should take advantage of the interest shown by these 
institutions in order to entrench a capacity-building culture in South Africa in this 
area. Structured cooperation between Government, private sector and academia will 
go a long way towards resolving some of the challenges identified in this report.  
•  Government should take note of the reservations of the private sector about aspects 
of its policy and legislative framework, and seek to reassure the private sector of its 
commitment to sound principles of governance. This process should include discus-
sions about capacity-building partnerships as well as research and development. In 
this regard, the NCPF proposes various structures that should promote cooperation 
between government, private sector and the academia in this regard. 
• All stakeholders should reaffirm their commitment to negotiating and agreeing on a 
sound and effective policy and legislative framework for meeting the urgent chal-
lenge of securing South Africa’s CIIs, which are playing a vital role in providing es-
sential services.  
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